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As the convergence between our physical and digital worlds continue at a rapid
pace, securing our digital information is vital to our prosperity. Most current typi-
cal computer systems are unwittingly helpful to attackers through their predictable
responses. In everyday security, deception plays a prominent role in our lives and
digital security is no di↵erent. The use of deception has been a cornerstone technique
in many successful computer breaches. Phishing, social engineering, and drive-by-
downloads are some prime examples. The work in this dissertation is structured to
enhance the security of computer systems by using means of deception and deceit.
Deception-based security mechanisms focus on altering adversaries’ perception of
computer systems in a way that can confuse them and waste their time and resources.
These techniques exploit adversaries’ biases and present them with a plausible alter-
native to the truth bringing a number of unique advantages to computer security.
In addition, deception has been widely used in many areas of computing for decades
and security is no di↵erent. However, deception has only been used haphazardly in
computer security.
In this dissertation we present a framework where deception can be planned and in-
tegrated into computer defenses. We posit how the well-known Kerckho↵s’s principle
has been misinterpreted to drive the security community away from deception-based
mechanisms. We present two schemes that employ deception to protect users’ pass-
words during transmission and at rest when they are stored on a computer server.
Moreover, we designed and built a centralized deceptive server that can be hooked to
xiii
internet-facing servers giving them the ability to return deceptive responses. These
three schemes are designed, implemented, and analyzed for their security and perfor-
mance.
The use of deception in security, and in computing in general, shows some fruitful
results. This dissertation discusses some of the unique advantages of such mechanisms
and presents a framework to show how they can be integrated into computer defenses.
Also, it provides three practical schemes that employ deception in their design to
address some existing security challenges. We postulate that the use of deception can
e↵ectively enhance the e↵ectiveness of current security defenses and present novel
ways to address many security challenges.
11 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Overview
Most data is digitized and stored in organizations’ servers, making them a valuable
target. Advanced persistent threats (APT), corporate espionage, and other forms of
attacks are continuously increasing. Companies reported 142 million unsuccessful
attacks in the first half of 2013, as reported by Fortinet [158]. In addition, a recent
Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) points out that currently deployed
protection mechanisms are not adequate to address current threats [158]. The report
states that 66% of the breaches took months or years to discover, rising from 56%
in 2012. Furthermore, 84% of these attacks only took hours or less to infiltrate
computer systems [158]. Moreover, the report states that only 5% of these breaches
were detected using traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) while 69% were
detected by external parties [158].
These numbers are only discussing attacks that were discovered. Because only
5% of the attacks are discovered using traditional security tools, it is likely that the
reality is significantly worse as there are unreported and undiscovered attacks. These
findings show that the status quo of organizations’ security posture is not enough to
address current threats.
Within computer systems, software and protocols have been written for decades
with an intent of providing useful feedback to every interaction. The original design
of these systems is structured to ease the process of error detection and correction by
informing the user about the exact reason why an interaction failed. This behavior
enhances the e↵orts of malfeasors by giving them information that helps them to
understand why their attack was not successful, refine their attacks and tools, and
2then re-attack. As a result, these systems are helpful to attackers and guide them
throughout their attack.
1.1.1 Thesis Statement
The use of deception to enhance the security of computer systems has occurred
since at least the 1980s. However, many computer defenses that use deception were
ad-hoc attempts to incorporate deceptive elements in their design. We hypothesize
that
“It is possible to develop a framework where the act of deceit is incorpo-
rated in the design of software to give system defenders an edge in the
conflict, increase the information obtained from a compromise attempt,
and increase the entropy of leaked information of targeted systems during
such an event. By using this framework, it is possible to augment a com-
puter system with a set of deception techniques to enhance its security by
achieving the goals of the aforementioned framework.”
To validate this hypothesis, we present a framework that can be used to plan and
integrate deception in computer security defenses. In addition, we discuss three novel
security defenses based on deception to enhance the security of computer systems.
We show how to use deceit to enhance the security of computer systems. The main
focus is to investigate methods of using deception to increase the entropy of infor-
mation leaked to the adversary about our systems and the information gained by
the adversary from its compromise attempts. Counter-deception, counter-attacking,
legal, and ethical issues of using deception are considered out-of-scope of this work,
despite their importance.
31.1.2 Dissertation Overview
The work in this dissertation discusses the unique advantages deception-based
security mechanisms can bring. In section 1.3, we give a detailed discussion of the
contribution of each chapter in the dissertation. During our work, we developed
a framework to plan and integrate deception into computer security defenses. We
discuss the di↵erent system components where deception can be applied – these com-
ponents are discussed in detail in section 4.5.1. The work in this dissertation applies
deception to three components as depicted in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1.: Computer Systems Components Where Deception is Applied in the
Dissertation
To enhance the security of users’ credentials and passwords, we describe apply-
ing deception to a system’s administrative internal data and a system’s decisions in
chapter 5 and 6. As illustrated in figure 1.2, we introduce a deceptive covert communi-
cation channel in authentication protocols to enhance passwords’ security and reduce
their exposure. This communication channel eliminates the need to send users’ pass-
word in the clear or to type them in the client. In addition, we raise stored passwords’
security at the server side by implementing the Ersatzpasswords scheme. This scheme
eliminates the possibility of cracking users’ passwords, without physical access to the
server’s hardware, while returning fake – i.e. ersatz – passwords to adversaries when
4they attempt to crack stored password files. Moreover, the ersatzpassword scheme
gives servers the ability to apply deception to a system’s decisions when adversaries
login using the cracked fake passwords. We discuss the details of these deceptive
techniques in chapters 5 and 6.
Figure 1.2.: Using Deception to Enhance Security – Dissertation Overview
Often, attackers use system responses to calibrate their attack during the recon-
naissance stage. We apply deception to system responses to enhance the overall
security of such systems. We build a deceptive server, which we refer to as Decep-
tiver, that tightly integrates with real production public-facing servers and alters their
replies to deceive adversaries, as depicted in figure 1.2. Deceptiver works as a cen-
tralized server that can be hooked to public-facing servers to alter their responses by
injecting deceit. The design and implementation of this deceptive server is discussed
in detail in chapter 7.
1.2 Terminology
Adversary Attribution — learn some information about computer adversaries that
can ultimately lead to their identification.
5Covert Channel — the covert channel term was introduced by Lampson in 1973
and defined as “channels not intended for information transfer at all” [89]. The
covert channel we are introducing in chapter 5 is designed to “not carry information”
as perceived by the adversary.
Cyber Kill-Chain — is an intelligence-driven security model introduced by Lock-
heed Martin [80].
Deceptiver — a deceptive internal server that is hooked to public-facing servers
to give them the ability to send deceptive responses.
Ersatzpasswords — fake passwords that are returned when an adversary tries to
crack the hashed passwords file using general tools such as John the Ripper1.
Honeyaccount — fake account in a computer system.
OODA — the OODA loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) is a cyclic
process model, proposed by John Boyd, by which an entity reacts to an event [20]. The
victory in any tactical conflict requires executing this loop faster than the opponent.
1.3 Dissertation Organization and Contribution
This dissertation contains most of the ideas published in a number of papers and
technical reports. Below is a description of the original work in this dissertation that
was developed as part of my research.
In chapter 2, we discuss a novel taxonomy of information protection mechanisms.
The original work was published in a paper that appeared at the 9th International
Conference on Cyber Warfare & Security conference (ICCWS’14) [6]. We present four
major categories of security controls, the objectives of each category, and investigate
the inter-relationships among di↵erent categories. In addition, we examine how our
taxonomy maps to di↵erent scales within organizations. Finally, we investigate how
the proposed categories interplay with each other to enhance the security of computer
systems. We also map these categories to the cyber kill-chain framework.
1http://www.openwall.com/john/
6Chapter 3 discusses the concept of deception. We present a discussion of deception
definition and maxims. In addition, we highlight the role of biases in the success of
any deceptive component. We discuss the di↵erent categories of biases and give a
number of examples on how they can be exploited to present a plausible alternative
of the truth. We also present an overview of the use of deception in military conflicts,
digital life, computing in general, and in security. We discuss how deception has been
used in HCI, HRI, robotics, and other areas of computing. Additionally, we present
an analysis of the previous work in using deception to raise the security of computer
systems. We conclude the chapter by discussing the principles of deception operations
and tactics. Part of the discussion in this chapter appeared in a paper at the New
Security Paradigm Workshop NSPW’14 [5].
In chapter 4 we discuss the role of deception in security – protecting or compromis-
ing computer systems. We examine some of the unique advantages deception-based
security defenses have over traditional tools. We posit how Kercho↵’s principle has
been misinterpreted to drive the community away from deception-based security. In
addition, we present a discussion on how deception can be modeled and argue that
deception is not the same as hacking back. In addition, we investigate how decep-
tive techniques can be planned and integrated into computer security defenses. We
develop a framework that can be used to achieve such a goal along with assessing
the additional risks and monitoring these controls. We discuss the di↵erent system’s
components where deception can be applied and analyze the methods that can be
used to create a plausible deception-based security defense. Additionally, we map
two previous uses of deception against our framework and show how it does capture
all the elements in their design. We conclude this chapter by presenting a case study
where our framework is used to enhance the security of a web application. The con-
tribution in this chapter has been published at New Security Paradigms Workshop
(NSPW’14) [5] and in the International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism
(IJCWT) [7].
7Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present three deception-based security mechanisms we de-
veloped. In each chapter we present a brief discussion of the security problem we
are trying to solve, discuss our solution in detail, and finally present an investigation
of the security and performance of each scheme. Chapter 5 shows how the use of a
deceptive covert channel can enhance the security of authentication protocols. Er-
satzpassword scheme in chapter 6 presents a solution to the problem of passwords
storage and cracking. Finally, in chapter 7 we discuss our deceptive server (Decep-
tiver) that can be hooked to public-facing servers giving them the ability to respond
with deceptive responses. The contribution in chapter 5 appeared at the International
Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (IFIP SEC’15) [4].
In chapter 8 we present a summary of the contribution of this dissertation and
possible directions for future research.
82 A TAXONOMY OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS’ DEFENSES
Achieving security cannot be done with a single, silver-bullet solution; instead, e↵ec-
tive security involves a collection of mechanisms that work together to balance the
cost of securing our systems with the possible damage caused by security compro-
mises, and drive the success rate of attackers to the lowest possible level. In Figure
2.1, we present a taxonomy of protection mechanisms commonly used in computer
systems. The diagram shows four major categories of protection mechanisms and
illustrates how they intersect achieving multiple goals.
The main motivation of this approach is to show the range of security controls that
an organization can deploy, the objectives of each category, and how these mechanisms
interact with each other to achieve better overall security. In this chapter, we discuss
some of the interesting relationships among these categories and examine how this can
be exploited to link isolated security controls. To fit all the pieces of our taxonomy
together, for a holistic and practical approach to security, we map our taxonomy to
the cyber kill-chain model introduced by Lockheed Martin in [80]. We develop and
expand some of the stages of the cyber kill-chain model and show that we can have
more e↵ective security controls at each stage.
The rationale behind having these intersecting categories is that a single layer
of security is not adequate to protect organizations, so multi-level security controls
are needed [141]. This model follows a natural chronological progression of security
defender goals when interacting with an attacker. First, we would like to deny unau-
thorized access and isolate our information systems from untrusted agents. However,
if adversaries succeed in penetrating these security controls, we should have degra-
dation and obfuscation mechanisms in place to slow their lateral movement in pene-
trating our internal systems. At the same time, these tools makes the extraction of
information from penetrated systems more challenging.
9Figure 2.1.: Taxonomy of Information Protection Mechanisms
Often, even if we slow attackers down and obfuscate stored information, advanced
adversaries may explore our systems undetected. This motivates the need for a third
category of security controls that involves using means of deceit and negative infor-
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mation. These techniques are designed to lead attackers astray and augment our
systems with decoys to detect stealthy adversaries. Furthermore, this deceitful infor-
mation wastes attackers’ time and adds risk during their infiltration. The final group
of mechanisms in our taxonomy is used to gain information about the attackers and
give us the ability to have counter-operations. Booby-trapped software is one example
of counter-operations that can be employed.
To show how our taxonomy can be applied at di↵erent levels and granularity
within computer systems, we plot these four categories across five levels of scale. We
use figure 2.2 to depict this. These five levels are
• Data items; this includes files and objects.
• Databases; which are collections of data items creating larger, coherent objects.
• Systems; this refers to individual systems within our organization. For example,
end-points and servers fall into this category.
• Networks; which are a network of systems connected together with communi-
cation equipment such as switches and routers.
• Enterprises; which refers to the highest level of abstraction in the digital realm.
This abstraction also includes parts that deal with users and human actors.
2.1 The Four Categories of Protection Mechanisms
Securing a system is an economic activity and organizations have to strike the
right balance between cost and benefits. Our taxonomy provides a holistic overview
of security controls, with an understanding of the goals of each group and how they
interact with each other. This empowers decision makers on what and which security
controls they should deploy. In the four sections that follow we discuss each one of
the four categories, illustrating their goals and providing some practical examples.
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Figure 2.2.: Plotting the Taxonomy Over Multiple Scales
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2.1.1 Denial and Isolation
The first, and most common, mechanism used to protect information systems is to
deny all access, execution, and manipulation of our systems and data unless explicitly
allowed. This gives us the ability to create a boundary around our systems isolating
them from the outside. This group covers a wide variety of security controls that
can be sub-grouped into three major categories: (i) controls installed around the
perimeter, such as firewalls; (ii) within our internal systems, such as access control;
and (iii) at the end-points, such as anti-virus and intrusion prevention.
We give several examples of mechanisms in the upper-most oval of figure 2.1.
Security controls in this category are designed to achieve two main goals:
• Prevent unauthorized access to information stored in our systems.
• Hide the existence and/or the nature of our systems and/or the data stored in
them.
Such mechanisms can be applied at all scales within our information systems as
presented in figure 2.2. At the enterprise level, we employ security controls such
as firewalls and access control systems. More advanced mechanisms such as having
unique system architecture and advanced intrusion prevention systems can be used.
At the network level technologies such as network address translation (NAT) and
virtual private networks (VPNs) are used to isolate and hide parts of our systems
denying unauthorized access to them. Denial mechanisms can also be applied at the
systems level. Tools such as data execution prevention (DEP) [123] and patching
security vulnerabilities are commonly used. More sophisticated mechanisms such as
dynamic instruction sets can be used to obfuscate the instruction set a computer can
execute and, therefore, prevent any unauthorized programs from running [172]. At
the database and data item granularity level, mechanisms such as encryption can be
used.
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2.1.2 Degradation and Obfuscation
When adversaries overcome the first line of defense, we have three general classes
of objectives: detect them, slow them down, and disguise and/or hide our data.
Many security mechanisms are used to address these issues. Security controls in this
category are designed to achieve the following goals:
• Slow down the attackers.
• Prevent and significantly reduce the probability that an adversary can recover
sensitive data.
• Obfuscate the value/nature of our systems and/or the data stored in them.
• Create noise around valuable information to reduce its utility.
At the data item level, mechanisms such as k-anonymity [148] and plausibly de-
niable search [108] have been used to degrade the information obtained – directly
and indirectly – from users’ data. At the systems’ level, slowing down the response
of system calls when detecting anomalies has been proposed to degrade adversaries’
infiltration speed [77]. At the network level, tarpits are used to throttle the spread
of malware and spam within organizations [53]. We note that there is a shortage of
these techniques to employ at the top level in our hierarchy – the enterprise level.
2.1.3 Negative Information and Deception
Despite all the controls organizations have in place, attackers might infiltrate
information systems and operate without being detected or slowed. In addition,
persistent adversaries might infiltrate the system and passively observe for a while to
avoid being detected and/or slowed when moving on to their targets. As a result, the
next layer of defense is needed to augment our systems with negative and deceptive
information to lead attackers astray. We may also significantly enhance organizational
intrusion detection capabilities by deploying deception-based detection methods.
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Negative information alters the way computer systems are perceived, which in-
cludes the use of deception [166]. However, deception alters such perception in a way
that is advantageous to system defenders. Deceptive techniques are an integral part
of human behavior. As an example, deception is widely used in sports; teams attempt
to deceive the other team into believing they are following a particular plan so as to
influence their course of action. Use of cosmetics may also be viewed as a form of
mild deception. We use lies in conversation to hide mild lapses in etiquette. In cyber
security, deception and decoy-based mechanisms have been used in security for more
than two decades in technologies such as honeypots and honeytokens. We present a
survey of the use of deception in computing and in security in sections 3.5, 3.6, and
3.7.
Deception-based techniques are increasingly gaining interest within the informa-
tion security community [5, 7, 66, 74]. Security controls in this category are designed
to achieve four main goals.
• Lead the attackers astray and waste their time and resources, giving defenders
an edge in the OODA loop [20].
• Add decoys to our system to detect data leakage and intrusions, enhancing the
understanding of the attackers’ goals and tools.
• Add doubt to the data obtained by the adversary.
• Increase the risk of attacking our computer systems.
We discuss the advantages of using deception-based security defenses further in
section 4.3.1.
When attackers infiltrate the system and successfully overcome traditional de-
tection and degradation mechanisms we would like to have the ability to not only
obfuscate our data, but also lead the attackers astray by deceiving them and drawing
their attention to other pieces of data that are false or intentionally misleading. Fur-
thermore, exhausting attackers and causing frustration is also a successful defensive
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outcome. Planting fake keys and using schemes such as endless files [142] can achieve
this. These files look small on the organization servers but when downloaded to be ex-
filtrated will exhaust the adversaries’ bandwidth and raise some alarms. We provide
a survey of previously used deception-based defenses in section 3.7. With carefully
designed deceiving information we can even cause damage at the adversaries’ servers.
A traditional, successful, deception technique can be learned from the well-known
story of the Farewell Dossier during the cold war where the CIA provided modified
hardware and software designs to a Soviet spy ring [169]. When the Soviets used
these products thinking they were legitimate, it resulted in a major disaster a↵ecting
a trans-Siberian pipeline.
A relationship can be observed between the first category and deception, especially
in the concept of hiding. By definition, both denial and deception can involve hiding
things from adversaries. However, in this dissertation we consider the purpose of
hiding as an important distinguisher. If we hide things to alter the way adversaries
perceive targeted systems, this is considered deception, otherwise, we refer to it as
denial.
Another relationship can be observed between the last group of protection tech-
niques, namely attribution, and deception techniques. Deception-based mechanisms
are an e↵ective way to lure attackers to expose themselves and their objectives when
we detect them accessing things and conducting unusual activities. Other tools, such
as anomaly-based IDS have similar goals, but the advantage deception-based tools
have is that there is a clear line between normal user activities and abnormal ones.
This is because legitimate users are not supposed to access implanted fake infor-
mation. This di↵erence significantly enhances the e↵ectiveness of deception-based
security controls and reduces the number of false-positives, as well as the size of the
system’s log file.
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2.1.4 Attribution and Counter-Operations
Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist, once wrote;
“if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in
a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself,
you will win one and lose one” [156].
This brilliantly summarizes the current security state of many organizations around
the world. We need to know the attackers, attribute them and understand their
objectives. Security controls in this last category are designed to achieve three main
goals:
• Attribute the adversaries.
• Cause damage to attackers.
• Increase overall risk in attacking our systems.
One of the traditional ways of learning about adversaries is analyzing the logs gen-
erated by our systems. However, one of the main challenges that has been hindering
the adaptation of such mechanisms – intended for attributing adversaries – is mixing
those mechanisms with counter-attacking and “hacking back”. This misconception is
discussed further in section 4.6.2. We argue that attribution can be achieved using a
wide variety of mechanisms without having to address the ethical and political issues
surrounding counter-attacking.
We argue that intelligently planting deceptive information within our informa-
tion systems can help us both in attributing some adversaries and detecting leakage.
Steganographic watermarking data can also serve as a means of detecting leakage and
possibly providing attribution of sources. In chapter 6, we present a scheme of inte-
grating deceptive information in password files to enhance their security and detect
their leakage.
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2.2 Fitting the Pieces Together – Cyber Kill-Chain Model
Employing techniques from all four categories provides a more e↵ective approach
than only using one or two. Additionally, security is an economic activity and dis-
tributing budget at multiple layers may provide a better return on investment than
more focused spending.
The cyber kill-chain introduced by Lockheed Martin researchers advocates for an
intelligence-driven security model [80]. The main premise behind this model is that
for attackers to be successful they need to go through all these steps in the chain in
sequence. Breaking the chain at any step will break the attack and the earlier that
we break it the better we prevent the attackers from attacking our systems.
The deployment of the cyber kill-chain was seen as fruitful for Lockheed when
they were able to detect an intruder who successfully logged into their system using
the SecurID vulnerability [76]. To show how all the protection categories discussed
above can fit together in protecting organizations we map them against the cyber
kill-chain model summarized in table 2.1.
2.2.1 The Role of Deception
The consensus is that we would like to be at least one step ahead of adversaries
when they attack our systems. We argue that by intelligently incorporating deceit
in our security models we can start achieving that. This is because the further we
enhance our abilities to detect adversaries the further ahead of them we position our-
selves. We discuss the advantages of deception-based security mechanisms in further
detail in section 4.3.1.
If we take an example of external network probing, if we simply detect an attack
and identify a set of IP addresses and domain names as “bad,” we do not achieve
much; these can be easily changed and adversaries will become more careful not to
raise an alarm the next time they probe our systems. However, if we go one more




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cause them greater di culty for their future attacks. For example, if we are able to
deceive attackers in manners that allow us to gather more information about them –
distinguishing them based on their fixed artifacts (such as distinctive protocol headers,
known tools, and/or behavior and traits) – we have a better position for defense. The
design of the deceptive server “Deceptiver” in chapter 7 is structured to achieve such
goals.
The cyber kill-chain model is a good framework to demonstrate the e↵ectiveness
of incorporating deception at multiple levels in the chain. With the same underlying
principle of the kill-chain – early detection of adversaries – we argue that the earlier
we detect adversaries, the better we are at deceiving them and learning more about
their methods and techniques. We postulate that full intelligence cannot be gathered
without using some means of deception techniques.
As Sun Tzu noted, the better we know our enemies the better we can defend
against them. By using means of deception we can continuously learn about attackers
at di↵erent phases of the kill-chain and enhance our capabilities of detecting them
and reducing their abilities to attack us. This negative correlation is an interesting
relationship between our ability to detect attackers and their ability to probe our
resources.
2.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we discussed how di↵erent categories of information protection
relate and interact. This taxonomy gives us a holistic view of how to protect computer
systems. We discussed the four categories in our taxonomy, their goals and gave a
number of examples from currently deployed tools. We analyzed how the intelligence-
driven security model – cyber kill-chain – can be used to plan and deploy security
tools. We concluded the chapter by highlighting the role of deception and negative
information in enhancing the security of computer systems. This discussion is a
20
preface to the next two chapters that investigate the concept of deception and how it
can be used to enhance the security of computer systems.
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3 DECEPTION
Deception has been in use for many millennia, perhaps for nearly as long as life
has existed on planet Earth. Plants, animals, and insects have been using deceptive
techniques as a means for defense and survival. Humans are no exception to the use
of deception. Illusionists use it to entertain us, con artists to cheat us, and military
strategists to attack and defend us. Digital realms are no di↵erent from the “real
world” as deception has found its way into computerized systems. In this chapter,
we give an overview of the concept of deception and some of the major areas where
deception has been used. We primarily focus on areas where deception has been used
in conflicts between di↵erent parties.
As human beings, we are not good at detecting deception. In 39 di↵erent studies
by Vrij, he found that the mean accuracy rate for college students to detect deception
was 57%, which is almost as poor as random choice (i.e., 50%) [162]. This rate is
slightly worse with law enforcement o cers, who scored a mean accuracy rate of
54% [162]. Whaley clearly states in his seminal book “Stratagem: Deception and
Surprise in War,” which is the largest open source empirical analysis of the use of
deception in conflicts, that “indeed, this is a general finding of my study – that is,
the deceiver is almost always successful regardless of the sophistication of his victim
in the same art.” [171].
3.1 General Definition of Deception
A misperception that is “intentionally induced by actions of other entities” is
a deception [170]. It is important to note that deception is targeted at altering
perceptions to gain an advantage as illustrated in figure 3.1 – adapted from [170].
22
Figure 3.1.: Deception and Perception
3.2 Deception and the Truth – A Taxonomy
3.2.1 Simulation and Dissimulation – Bell and Whaley
Bell and Whaley argue that deception always involves two steps: dissimulation,
hiding the real, and simulation, showing the false [11]. Deception must involve these
two together, even if only implicitly. The act of hiding and showing can applied
to the (i) nature, (ii) existence and/or (iii) the value of targeted information. The
authors also o↵ered a taxonomy of deceptive techniques where they distinguished
among three ways of dissimulating — masking, repackaging, and dazzling — and
three ways of simulating — mimicking, inventing, and decoying. A brief discussion of
each one of those is given below. Additionally, later in section 4.5.1 we discuss how
to create deceptive security techniques using this taxonomy.
Dunnigan and Nofi propose another taxonomy in [51]. Their taxonomy has the
following groups: concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, lies, dis-
plays, ruses, demonstrations, feints, and insights. We found that each one of these
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categories either has a direct mapping to one of Bell and Whaley’s categories or is an
example of one of them.
Masking
The obvious act of any deceptive technique is to hide the real by masking it such
that it can remain undetected. A traditional example can be seen in behavior of
the chameleon where it changes its color to blend with the background deceiving
any predator and masking itself as if it does not exist. As we discussed earlier in
section 2.1.3, hiding is only considered deception if it is an act of deceit, otherwise it
is considered denial.
Repackaging
Fully masking something as if it does not exist can be challenging. In some cases,
it might be much easier to “repackage” that thing as something else. The repackaging
can go both ways by making something dangerous appear as harmless or vice versa.
Moreover, repackaging can make something important look totally irrelevant, thus
driving attention away from it. A traditional example of this can be seen in the
behavior of the “mantis” insects where they repackage themselves as sticks to avoid
bird predators.
Dazzling
This is considered to be the weakest form of dissimulation, where we simply confuse
the targeted objects with others. When an object cannot be masked or repackaged,
we use dazzling to dissimulate it. One prime example of using this in technology is
injecting tra c to reduce the exposure of tra c analysis attacks [60].
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Mimicking
When we hide the real we necessarily show the false, even if only implicitly by
showing “nothing.” The first method of simulation techniques is to show the false, by
mimicking something true, to gain an advantage. As an example, when the mantis
insects hide, by mimicking a stick, they are also luring prey close enough to be seized.
Inventing
Mimicking requires the item to look like something else, however, when this is
not so easy to achieve, invention can be used instead. When inventing we create a
new reality instead of mimicking the existence of another one. Rubber tanks are one
prime example of inventing a reality [170].
Decoying
Decoying is one of the most commonly used simulation techniques to deceive. In
decoying, the deceiver simply tells a common truth but then resort to something
di↵erent, and often less predictable. This is common in many sports where a team
might formulate their position to give the impression that they are defending, but
then they play an o↵ensive play.
3.2.2 Linguistic Case Theory
Rowe used linguistic case theory to provide a taxonomy for the use of deception
in cyber space [129]. He argues that every deceptive action can be categorized by an
“associated semantic and case(s).” Adopting the list of semantic cases by Copeck et
al. [38] with additional relationships from AI, Rowe suggested a taxonomy of deception
consisting of 32 semantic cases grouped in seven categories: spatial cases, time cases,
participant cases, causality cases, quality cases, essence cases, and speech-act cases.
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This taxonomy can be useful when brainstorming possible deceptive techniques to be
used in defending computer systems.
3.3 Deception Maxims
Bennett and Waltz discussed four deception maxims that are core to any inves-
tigation of the user of deception; namely truth, denial, deceit, and misdirection [12].
In this section we discuss the relationships among these principles adding a fifth one
that is equally as important; namely confusion.
3.3.1 Truth/Reality
Truth is the accurate perception of everything about the observed. Deception is
an active act directed at manipulating such perception. For deception to succeed,
there must be an accurate perception that we are trying to manipulate [12]. Truth
should constitute most of the information that is perceived by an adversary. Mitchell
and Thompson highlight this principle by stating that “all deception works within the
context of honesty” [98]. Handel provides four rules of what truth should be presented
to the target [71]:
1. The deceiver should supply the target with correct low-grade information; i.e.
“chicken-feed.”
2. Correct information that is already known by the opponent should always be
presented to the target.
3. The deceiver should often pass correct information to the target when he can
control its arrival time to be after it is of any use.
4. The deceiver might need to sacrifice some important information such that he
can lure the target into believing some deceit that would have not been believed
otherwise.
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Handel summarizes his discussion with this quote “The more one has a reputa-
tion of honesty – the easier it is to lie convincingly. Even more concisely, honest
people/states can deceive the best” [71].
3.3.2 Deceit
“All deception requires deceit” as said by Bennett and Waltz [12]. In other words,
all deception requires the deceiver to intentionally lie about something to the target.
Everyone lies in their daily lives. Ford cites some studies showing that 90% of Amer-
icans admitted that they lie about their feelings, income, sex lives, accomplishments,
life, and age [57].
There is a fundamental di↵erence between simple lies and deception. The former
focuses on only one side of the communicated message; namely the liar [43]. The
latter adds to that the other side of the message, namely the receiver, and how this
lie a↵ects his perception and/or actions [43].
3.3.3 Denial, Misdirection and Confusion
There are three general way to manipulate a target’s perception of truth and
deceit with respect to deception. We can deny the target access to the truth and
show him the deceit instead. When we cannot stop the truth from being observed we
can misdirect the target’s focus to the deceit. When we cannot influence the target’s
focus, we can confuse the target by presenting him with the truth and one or more
plausible deceits.
3.4 Deception and Biases
In cognitive psychology a bias refers to
“An inclination to judge others or interpret situations based on a personal
and oftentimes unreasonable point of view” [12]
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Biases are a cornerstone component to the success of any deception-based mech-
anisms. The target of the deception needs to be presented with a plausible “deceit”
to successfully deceive and/or confuse him. If the target perceives this deceit to be
non-plausible she is more inclined to reject it instead of believing it, or at least raise
her suspicions about the possibility of currently being deceived. A successful decep-
tion should exploit a bias in the attackers’ perception and provide them with one or
more plausible alternative information other than the truth.
Thompson et al. discuss four major groups of biases any analysts need to be aware
of: personal biases, cultural biases, organizational biases, and cognitive biases [151]. It
can be seen in figure 3.2 that the more specific the bias being exploited in a deceptive
security tool is, the less such a tool can be generalized, For example, exploiting a
number of personal biases, specific to an attacker, might not be easily generalized
to other adversaries who attack your system. However, the more specific the choice
of bias enhances the e↵ectiveness of the deceptive component. This is true partly
because cognitive biases are well-known and adversaries might intentionally guard
themselves with an additional layer of explicit reasoning to minimize their e↵ects in
manipulating their perceptions. In the following paragraphs we discuss each one of
these classes of biases.
Figure 3.2.: Deception Target Biases
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3.4.1 Personal Biases
Personal biases are those biases that originate from either first-hand experiences
or personal traits, as discussed by Jervis in [82]. These biases can be helpful in design-
ing deceptive components/operation; however, they are (i) harder to obtain as they
require specific knowledge of potential attackers and (ii) they make deceptive com-
ponents less applicable to a wider range of attackers while becoming more powerful
against specific attackers. Personal biases have been exploited in traditional decep-
tion operations in war, such as exploiting the arrogance of Hitler’s administration in
World War II as part of Operation Fortitude [12].
3.4.2 Cultural Biases
Hofstede refers to cultural biases as the “software of the mind” [78]. They rep-
resent the mental and cognitive ways of thinking, perception, and action by humans
belonging to these cultures. In a study conducted by Guss and Dorner, they found
that cultures influenced the subjects’ perception, strategy development and decision
choices, even though all those subjects were presented with the same data [68]. Hofst-
ede discusses six main dimensions of cultures and assigns quantitative values to those
dimensions for each culture in his website (geerte-hofstede.com). Also, he associates
di↵erent behavior that correlates with his measurements. Theses dimensions are:
1. Power Distance Index (PDI) — PDI is a measure of the expectation and
acceptance that “power is distributed unequally.” Hofstede found that cultures
with high PDI tend to have a sense of loyalty, show of strength, and preference to
in-group-person. This feature can be exploited by a deception planner focusing
on the attacker’s sense of pride to reveal himself, knowing that the attack is
originating from a high PDI culture with a show-of-strength property.
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2. Individualism versus Collectivism (IVC) — A collectivist society values
the “betterment of a group” at the expense of the individual. Hofstede found
that most cultures are collectivist, i.e. with low IVC index.
3. Masculine versus Feminine (MVF) — A masculine culture is a culture
where “emotional gender roles are clearly distinct.” For example, an attacker
coming from a masculine culture is more likely to discredit information and
warnings written by or addressed to a female. In this case, this bias can be
exploited to influence attackers’ behaviors.
4. Uncertainty Avoidance Cultures (UAI) — This measures the cultural re-
sponse to the unknown or the unexpected. High UAI means that this culture
has a fairly structured response to uncertainty making the attackers’ anticipa-
tion of deception and confusion a much easier task.
5. Long-Term Orientation versus Short-Term Orientation (LTO vs. STO)
—STO cultures usually seek immediate gratification. For example, the defender
may sacrifice information of lesser importance to deceive an attacker into think-
ing that such information is of importance, in support of an over-arching goal
of protecting the most important information.
6. Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) — This dimension characterizes cul-
tures on their norms of how they choose activities for leisure time and happi-
ness.
Wirtz and Godson summarize the importance of accounting for cultures while de-
signing deception in the following quote; “To be successful the deceiver must recognize




Organizational biases are of importance when designing deception for an target
within a heavily structured environment [12]. In such organizations there are many
keepers who have the job of analyzing information and deciding what is to be passed
to higher levels of analysts. This is one example of how organizational biases can be
used. These biases can be exploited causing important information to be marked as
less important while causing deceit to be passed to higher levels. One example of
organizational biases is uneven distribution of information led to uneven perception
and failure to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 by the United States [12].
3.4.4 Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are common among all humans across all cultures, personalities,
and organizations. They represent the “innate ways human beings perceive, recall,
and process information” [12]. These biases have long been studied by many re-
searchers around the world in many disciplines (particularly in cognitive psychology);
they are of importance to deception design as well as computing.
Tversky and Kahneman proposed three general heuristics our minds seem to use
to reduce a complex task to a simpler judgment decision – especially under con-
ditions of uncertainty – thus leading to some predictable biases [153]. These are:
representativesness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment. They defined the
representativeness heuristic as a “heuristic to evaluate the probability of an event by
the degree to which it is (i) similar in essential properties to its parent population;
and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated” [153]. The
availability heuristic is another bias that assess the likelihood of an uncertain event
by the ease with which someone can bring it to mind. Finally, the anchoring/adjust-
ment heuristic is a bias that causes us to make estimations closer to the initial values
we have been provided with than is otherwise warranted.
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Solman presented a discussion of two reasoning systems postulated to be common
in humans: associative (system 1) and rule-based (system 2) [140]. System 1 is
usually automatic and heuristic-based, and is usually governed by habits. System
2 is usually more logical with rules and principles. Both systems are theorized to
work simultaneously in the human brain; deception targets System 1 to achieve more
desirable reactions.
In 1994, Tversky and Koehler argued that people do not subjectively attach proba-
bility judgments to events; instead they attach probabilities to the description of these
events [154]. That is, two di↵erent descriptions of the same event often lead people to
assign di↵erent probabilities to their likelihood. Moreover, the authors postulate that
the more explicit and detailed the description of the event is, the higher the prob-
ability people assign to it. In addition, they found that unpacking the description
of the event into several disjoint components increases the probability people attach
to it. Their work provides an explanation for the errors often found in probability
assessments associated with the “conjunction fallacy” [155]. Tversky and Kahneman
found that people usually would give a higher probability to the conjunction of two
events, e.g. P(X and Y), than a single event, e.g. P(X) or P(Y). They showed that
humans are usually more inclined to believe a detailed story with explicit details over
a short compact one.
3.5 The Use of Deception in War, Military and Conflicts
Deception has long been used as a prime tool within the intelligence community
and historically in war. The Greek’s Trojan horse illustrates the age of such tech-
niques. The Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu states that “All warfare is based on
deception” [156]. The Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4 defines military deception as [25];
“Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision mak-
ers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby
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causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will con-
tribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”
Earlier in this chapter, we discussed many example of deceptive techniques used by
living creatures and existing in nature. Gerwehr and Glenn give a detailed discussion
of the use of deception in military applications [64]. Latimer, in his book “Deception
in War” [90], provides an extensive discussion of the use of deception in war and
military conflicts. Additionally, Brown discusses the deception operation in the D-
Day invasion in his book “Bodyguard of Lies” [22].
3.6 General Use of Deception in Computing
3.6.1 In Human-to-Human Digital Interaction
Je↵ Hancock studies the act of deception by normal users in the digital age [70].
His studies focus on users’ behavior investigating why and how they lie in the digital
world. He developed a number of algorithms to distinguish between fake and true
user’s generated content. In addition, he examined people’s online behaviors and the
fake information they post about themselves and others.
Galanxhi and Nah studied the behavior of deceivers and truth-tellers in cyberspace
[61]. They investigated whether the use of avatars influences one’s perception of the
truthfulness of the other communicating partner. Their research mainly focuses on the
communication aspects of such behavior. They primarily investigate how deception
happens in such environments and explore the features that enable such behavior.
3.6.2 In Human Computer Interaction (HCI)
Most of the research on the use of deception in HCI focuses on the user of malev-
olent deception, often referred to as dark patterns1 [1,37]. This goes inline with many
design guidelines that asserts that a good design should not lie to users [134]. In
1http://darkpatterns.org/
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addition, Conti and Sobiesk characterized user interfaces that trick – mislead or de-
ceive the user – as malicious [37]. They discuss a number of examples of how such
techniques can be used to lie to users and spoof their content. They examined the
a↵ect of using such techniques on increasing user frustration.
Nevertheless, Adar et al. make a distinction between malevolent and benevolent
deception [1]. They argue that the latter often is a helpful technique in improving
users’ experiences in HCI. The authors also discussed how regular users employ de-
ception to avoid unwanted interruptions. For example, using tools that auto-respond
to your contacts and make you appear online at random times are deceptive tech-
niques. Moreover, Adar and his group contend that the use of deception in HCI often
helps users rather than harm them [1]. They examined the use of deception in HCI
arguing that such techniques are often used to: (i) create users’ delight (e.g. by pro-
viding the user control over the system or hinting to the existence of some features),
or (ii) mask computer failures. Often such techniques help system designers to direct
users into acting in predictable ways. They argue that the common gap between the
user’s desire from a computer system and the reality of such system motivates and
enables the use of deception to cover it. They divide this gap into the following four
categories.
• A gap between the user’s metal model and the underlying system’s model.
This is one of the most common gaps in HCI where deceptive techniques are used
to bridge the gap between users’ and systems’ models. Such a gap can occur
because of performance and failure issues, to hide uncertainties, to guarantee a
certain level of pleasure and entertainment, or to increase the level of comfort
and credibility [1]. An example can be be seen in the early phone call routing
systems, 1ESS. In such systems, when a failure occurred in connecting two
users the system connected the caller to a random number instead of dropping
the call. This technique was used to deceive the user into believing that they
misdialed the number instead of experiencing a system failure [1]. A more
recent example is deployed by Netflix in their recommendation system. Their
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system will use the general “popular movies” recommender engine when their
personalized recommender fails [31]. The user is not aware of this switch and
would continue to interact with the system as if the viewed recommendations
are based on her personal preferences
• Where the needs of an individual must be balanced with the needs of a group.
An example of such interface design can been seen in password failed authen-
tication responses. Clearly, it is more useful for the user to tell her exactly if
the typo was in the username or the password, instead of asking her to type
them both again. However, the security of the whole system is raised by not
explicitly specifying which part of the credentials is wrong. In this case, it is
a recommended security practice to “lie” to users and tell them to type both
credentials again raising the cost of brute-forcing other accounts’ passwords.
• When a person must be protected from oneself.
When a user deletes a file or drags it to the trash, the file is not immediately
deleted. In the physical world, the town of Dusseldorf has a fake bus stop set
next to a senior care center to catch Alzheimer patients who sneak out of the
center [120]. They wait at the bus stop instead of wandering around and getting
lost.
• When trying to meet conflicting design goals.
It is important to note that there is a fundamental di↵erence between deception
and abstraction. Often, the line between the two is fuzzy. We discuss this further, in
section 4.6.4, where we make a clear distinction between deception and abstraction.
3.6.3 In Robotics and Human Robot Interaction (HRI)
The application of deception in robotics has been used to improve the user’s
experiences or add additional features [102, 139, 157, 163]. Such behavior adds value
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to those machines, for example, calming patients or helping them to overcome their
self-imposed limits. In addition, deploying deceptive behavior in robots bring a set
of advantages to their use in the military domain.
Camouflage and motion camouflage are widely used deceptive techniques that
have found their way into robotics. Researchers at Harvard university developed a
“soft” robot that is capable of changing the color of its body to match the surrounding
environment [102]. Motion camouflage, which is used by dragonflies, is a deceptive
behavior where the creature follows an indirect trajectory to appear stationary while
approaching its target. Rano discusses the use of such techniques in robots for stealth
approaching [121].
Wagner and Arkin used interdependence theory [150] – which is a psychological
theory stating that interacting parties adjust their behavior in response to their per-
ception of social situations of reward and costs – to develop algorithms to be used
by robots to decide when and how to deceive [163]. Shim and Arkin adopted the
deceptive behavior used by squirrels in robots for resource allocation [139].
Within HRI deception has been used to instrument robots’ behavior to enhance
users’ experiences. In a study by Vazquez et al., they showed an increase in engage-
ment and enjoyment in a multi-player robotic game in the presence of a deceptive
robot referee [157]. Brewer et al. used deception in physical therapy robotic sys-
tems [21]. They presented rehabilitating patients with deceptive visual feedback on
the amount of force they are currently exerting. By making patients perceive a force
level lower than what they are really exerting, they will add additional force exceeding
their self-imposed mental limits.
3.6.4 In Computer-to-Computer Interaction
DeRosis et al. provide an extensive examination of such techniques in [45]. The
authors challenge the “sincerity principle” and discuss a number of scenarios where
computers should deliberately “lie.” In situations such as bargaining and personal
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assistance, software agents may “lie” in the short-term for optimal longer-term goals.
Christian and Young discussed in their work how agents can strategically “lie” to
achieve optimal goals [30].
3.7 The Use of Deception to Enhance Security
Throughout history, deception has evolved to find its natural place in our societies
and eventually our technical systems. Deception and decoy-based mechanisms have
been used in security for more than two decades in mechanisms such as honeypots
and honeytokens. An early example of how deception was used to attribute and
study attackers can be seen in the work of Cheswick in his well-known paper “An
Evening with Berferd” [28]. He discusses how he interacted with an attacker in real
time providing him with fabricated responses. Two of the earliest documented uses
of deceptive techniques for computer security are in the work of Cli↵ Stoll in his
book “The Cuckoo’s Egg” [146] and the work of Spa↵ord in his own lab [142]. The
Deception Toolkit (DTK)2, developed by Fred Cohen 1997 was one of the first publicly
available tools to use deception for the purpose of computer defenses.
In late 1990s, “honeypots” – “a component that provides its value by being at-
tacked by an adversary” i.e. deceiving the attacker to interact with them – have
been used in computer security. In 2003, Spitzner published his book on “Honeypots”
discussing how they can be used to enhance computer defenses [143]. Following on
the idea of honeypots, a proliferation of “honey-*” prefixed tools have been proposed.
We discuss the honey technologies in detail later in this section. With the release
of Tripwire, Kim and Spa↵ord suggested the use of planted files that should not be
accessed by normal users, with interesting names or locations and serving as bait that
will trigger an alarm if they are accessed by intruders [85].
O↵ensively, many current, common attacks use deceptive techniques as a corner-
stone of their success. For example, phishing attacks often use two-level deceptive
2 http://www.all.net/dtk/
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techniques; they deceive users into clicking on links that appear to be coming from le-
gitimate sources, which take them to the second level of deception where they will be
presented with legitimate-looking websites luring them to give their credentials. The
“Nigerian 419” scams are another example of how users are deceived into providing
sensitive information with the hope of receiving a fortune later.
In many of these cases, attackers focus on deceiving users as they are usually the
most vulnerable component. Kevin Mitnick showed a number of examples in his book,
“The Art of Deception” [99], of how he used social engineering, i.e., deceptive skills
to gain access to many computer systems. Trojan horses, which are more than 30
years old, are a prime example of how deception has been used to infiltrate systems.
Phishing, Cross-site Scripting (XSS) [161], and Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF)
[10] are some examples of using deception. Despite more than a decade of research by
both the academic and private sectors, these problems are causing more damage every
year. XSS and XSRF have remained on the OWASP’s top 10 list since the first time
they were added in 2007 [112]. The e↵ectiveness of o↵ensive deception techniques
should motivate security researchers to think of positive applications for deception in
security defenses.
3.7.1 Honeypots
Honeypots have been used in multiple security applications such as detecting and
stopping spam3 and analyzing malware [42]. In addition, honeypots have been used
to secure databases [56]. They are starting to find their way into mobile environments
[106] where some interesting results have been reported [164].
Honeypots in the literature come in two di↵erent types: server honeypot and
client honeypot. The server honeypot is a computer system that contains no valuable
information and is designed to appear vulnerable for the goal of enticing attackers
to access them. Client honeypots are more active. These are vulnerable user agents
3 http://www.projecthoneypot.org
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that troll many servers actively trying to get compromised [137]. When such incidents
happen, the client honeypots report the servers that are infecting users’ clients. Hon-
eypots have been used in computing in four main areas as we discuss in the following
paragraphs.
Detection. Honeypots provide an additional advantage over traditional detection
mechanisms such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and anomaly detection. First,
they generate less logging data as they are not intended to be used as part of normal
operations and thus any interaction with them is illicit. Second, the rate of false
positive is low as no one should interact with them for normal operations. Angnostakis
et al. propose an advanced honeypot-based detection architecture in the use of shadow
honeypots [9]. In their scheme they position Anomaly Detection Sensors (ADSs) in
front of the real system where a decision is made as whether to send the request
to a shadow machine or to the normal machine. The scheme attempts to integrate
honeypots with real systems by seamlessly diverting suspicious tra c to the shadow
system for further investigation. Finally, honeypots are also helpful in detecting
industry-wide attacks and outbreaks, e.g. the case of the Slammer worm as discussed
in [100].
Prevention. Honeypots are used in prevention where they assist in slowing down
the attackers and/or deterring them. Sticky honeypots are one example of machines
that utilize unused IP address space and interact with attackers probing the network
to slow them down [96]. In addition, Cohen argues that using his Deception ToolKit
(DTK) we can deter attackers by confusing them and introducing risk on their side
[33]. However, we are not aware of any studies that investigated those claims.
Beyond the notion of enticement and traps used in honeypots, deception has been
studied from other perspectives. For example, Rowe et al. present a novel way of
using honeypots for deterrence [131]. They protect systems by making them look
like a honeypot and therefore deter attackers from accessing them. Their observation
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stemmed from the developments of anti-honeypots techniques that employ advanced
methods to detect if the current system is a honeypot [79].
Response. One of the advantages of using honeypots is that they are totally inde-
pendent systems that can be disconnected and analyzed after a successful attack on
them without hindering the functionality of the production systems. This simplifies
the task of forensic analysts as they can preserve the attacked state of the system and
extensively analyze what went wrong.
Research. Honeypots are heavily used in analyzing and researching new families
of malware. The honeynet project4 is an “international non-profit security research
organization, dedicated to investigating the latest attacks and developing open source
security tools to improve Internet security.” For example, the HoneyComb system
uses honeypots to create unique attack signatures [88]. Other more specific tools
such as dionaea5 are designed to capture a copy of computer malware for further
study. Furthermore, honeypots help in inferring and understanding some widespread
attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [101].
3.7.2 Honey–* Tools
The prefix “honey-*” has been used to refer to a wide range of techniques that
incorporate the act of deceit in them. The basic idea behind the use of the prefix
word “honey” in these techniques is that they need to entice attackers to interact
with them, i.e. fall for the bait — the “honey.” When such an interaction occurs the
value of these methods is realized.
The term honeytokens has been proposed by Spitzner [144] to refer to honeypots
but at a smaller granularity. Stoll used a number of files with enticing names and




when they are accessed, to track down Markus Hess [146]. Yuill et al. coined the
term honeyfiles to refer to these files [176]. HoneyGen was also used to refer to tools
that are used to generate honeytokens [14].
3.7.3 Incorporating Deception into Other Security Defenses
There have been a number of interesting proposals to use deceit for enhancing
the security of computer systems beyond the traditional notion of honeypots. In this
section we give an overview of some of these schemes.
Passwords and Credentials Protection
Li and Schmitz proposed a framework to address phishing by using deception
and honeypot-like techniques [94]. The authors propose a framework that introduces
the concept of fake credential, referred to as a phoneytoken, and a number of client
honeypots, referred to as phoneybots. The main idea in their framework is that when
phishing is detected a number of phoneytokens will be sent to the phishing site. If
phishing is detected by a spamtrap, a real user will have to submit a phoneytoken,
however, if the detected phishing is using pharming or malware attacks, a phoneybot
will submit the phoneytoken. Banks can monitor these phoneytokens and then follow
the money trail when phishers are detected stealing money.
BogusBiter is a similar scheme proposed by Yue and Wang in [174]. The authors
develop a client add-on to the user’s browser that intercepts username/password sub-
missions when users override a phishing warning. Instead of stopping the submission
they submit additional (N   1) username/password pairs generated based on the
user’s credentials. The scheme also works with savvy users who obey the warnings
where the add-on submits a large number of randomly generated credentials to the
phishing website. The scheme also requires the installation of a server side component
that analyzes a username/passwords submission and triggers a silent alarm when a
“Bogus” credential has been submitted.
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Most recently, a scheme named Honeywords was proposed by Jules and Rivest
to confuse attackers when they crack a stolen hashed password file [84] by hiding
the real password among a list of “fake” ones. Their scheme augmenting password
databases with an additional (N   1) fake credentials [84]. If the DB is stolen and
cracked, attackers are faced with N di↵erent passwords to choose from where only
one of them is the correct one. However, if they use any of the fake ones the system
triggers an alarm alerting system administrators that the DB has been cracked.
Kontaxis et al. proposed a similar scheme in [87]. Their proposal relies on the
fact that users need to supply a voucher obtained from a vouching server along with
their username/password, which is an extra step they introduce in their scheme. The
vouching request must originate from the target server. They also add (N   1) decoy
passwords to the credentials DB. Unlike Honeyword, these password actually log the
user in and their main goal is to address the issue of a user using the same passwords
with the target and vouching servers.
Moreover, Zhao and Mannan used deceptive techniques to limit the e↵ectiveness
of automated online password guessing [177]. They provide “fake” sessions to an
adversary who is launching automated attacks while real users will detect the au-
thentication outcome implicitly from the presented user data.
Defaming Botnets
Ormerod et al. proposed a scheme that inject deceptive fake information to current
botnet zombies for two main goals: dilute the real stolen information and trace end-
users of botnet’s stolen information when they use this fake information [111]. Similar
to the honeywords proposal above, this fake information signals an alarm that a
“stolen” credentials/credit card/identity is currently being used.
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Obfuscation and Anti-Reconnaissance
Murphy et al. investigated the e cacy of using a host-based operating system
(OS) obfuscation as an integral part of Air Force computer defenses [107]. The
observation that motivated their study is that identifying the target’s OS is a key
component in any computer attack. Successfully masking this information can give
computer defenders an advantage. They used the OSfuscate tool [40], by Crenshaw,
and concluded that it is e↵ective in continuously obfuscating the host OS. They
recommend deploying this technique as part of Air Force computer defenses. However,
a challenge to deploying these methods can arise from the need to use administrative
tools that rely on accurately fingerprinting the OSs of managed computer systems to
undergo regular maintenance and patching operations.
Active Defense
Crane et al. discuss the use of “Booby Trapping Software” — an active security
defense mechanism for code-reuse attacks where deceptive techniques are used [39].
In additiona, Cohen and Koike presented a set of experiments where they successfully
induced skilled red-team attackers to attack the targeted system in a particular se-
quence [35]. The main goal was to mimic physical attack tactics where such techniques
can be used to drive prey into kill-zones by influencing their decisions, by means of
deception techniques, taking a specific path desired by the defenders. This was part
of a larger set of experiments where they used di↵erent deceptive mechanisms against
red-team attackers [36].
Trassare takes a di↵erent approach of using deception and presents a technique to
deceive attackers, who attack DoD networks by giving them a fake internal network
topology of the defender’s choice [152]. He presents a prototype implementation
showing positive results.
Rowe et al. used a “testbed” for automated defensive deception planning for
cyber-attacks [132]. Their approach was to make a complete system available for
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attackers to understand and plan deceptive operations for other systems. They re-
ported interesting findings of attackers’ behavior that can be used to design e↵ective
deceptive computer defenses.
Supply-Chain Protection
Spiegel published a report showing how the NSA intercepts equipment shipped
by Cisco and installs eavesdropping implants in it. To address this problem, Cisco
announced that they will help their customers by using some deceptive techniques to
mislead NSA. They o↵ered to ship customer equipment to a fake address making it
harder for the NSA to target and contaminate their supply chain [114].
3.8 Deception Operations and Tactics
Deception has long been used as an e↵ective operational tactic in warfare and
military conflicts. Fowler and Nesbitt highlight six rules for a successful deception
operation [58].
1. Expectedness. A successful deception should cause the enemy to believe what
he expects. The deceptive act should be designed to look no di↵erent than the
normal expected act, while the real act should be the surprising one.
2. Timely Feedback. A successful deception operation should involve a continu-
ous and timely feedback of the adversary’s reaction to the deceptive information.
This is crucially important as the targeted system could be vulnerable if attack-
ers successfully avoid the deceptive operation or conduct a counter-deception
operation.
3. Integration. The deception operation must be tightly integrated with the
real operation. In other words, real and deceptive plans must work together
supplementing each other’s activities.
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4. Suppression. A deception plan must not only provide believable activities for
the deception operation, but also hide any activity of the real operation.
5. Realism. The realism of any deception operation is a function of two important
factors; the adversary’s capabilities of observing responses and the time available
to analyze these responses. As an example, deceiving a drone attack with fake
tanks requires a di↵erent level of realism than deceiving an attacking army with
tanks on the borders of another country.
6. Creativity. A successful deception operation should be imaginative and cre-
ative.
Rowe and Rothstein used these rules and applied them to the case of cyberwar
in [133]. It can be seen that many of these rules highlight a number of limitations
of current deception-based defenses. As an example, honeypots violate the third rule
of integration as they are, in the default case, a standalone system(s) that are only
useful if the attackers decide to interact with them.
3.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the concept of deception and how it has been used.
We illustrated some of the well-known taxonomies of deceptive techniques; we adapt
these techniques in next chapter to show how they can be used to enhance computers’
security. We gave an overview of deception maxims and concepts. We presented an
investigation of the role of biases in ensuring the success of any deceptive technique.
After that, we then gave an overview of the use of deception in military conflicts and
computing. We discussed how deception has been widely used to enhance the utility
of technology and improve users’ experiences. Additionally, we gave an overview of
the previous uses of deception in computer security. We discussed the well-known
example of using honeypots to aid computer security. We concluded the chapter by
discussing some of the most important principles in deception operations and tactics.
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4 A FRAMEWORK FOR USING DECEPTION TO ENHANCE SECURITY
In everyday security, deception plays a prominent role in our lives. We leave lights on
to deter thieves and deceive them by pretending that someone is inside. To automate
such deceptive behavior, we might even have a timer that switches the light on and
o↵. Through history, deception has evolved to find its natural place in our societies
and eventually our technical systems. Deception and decoy-based mechanisms have
been used in security for more than two decades in techniques such as honeypots and
honeytokens, as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, little work has been
done in incorporating deception beyond such traditional concepts.
Deception-based techniques provide significant advantages over traditional secu-
rity controls. Currently, most security tools are responsive measures to attackers’
probes to previously known vulnerabilities. Whenever an attack surfaces, it is hit
hard with all preventative mechanisms at the defender’s disposal. Eventually, per-
sistent attackers find a vulnerability that leads to a successful infiltration by evading
the way tools detect probes or by finding new unknown vulnerabilities. This security
posture is partially driven by the assumption that “hacking-back” is unethical, while
there is a di↵erence between the act of “attacking back” and the act of deceiving
attackers, which is further discussed in section 4.6.2. With such behavior, attackers
progressively learn about systems’ defensive capabilities with their continuous prob-
ing. As a result, average computer systems are guiding their adversaries in how to
successfully infiltrate their own defenses. Meanwhile, targeted systems learn nothing
about these attempts, other than a panic in the security team. In fact, in many cases
multiple attempts that originate from the same entity are not successfully correlated.
There is a fundamental di↵erence in how deception-based mechanisms work in
contrast to traditional security controls. The latter usually focuses on attackers’
actions — detecting or preventing them — while the former focuses on attackers’
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perceptions — manipulating them and therefore inducing adversaries to take action-
s/inactions in ways that are advantageous to targeted systems; traditional security
controls position themselves in response to attackers’ actions while deception-based
tools are positioned in prospect of such actions. Later, in section 4.3.1, we discuss
some of the unique advantages deception-based security defenses bring.
4.1 Definition
One of the most widely accepted definitions of computer-security deception is
the one by Yuill [175]; Computer Deception is “Planned actions taken to mislead
attackers and to thereby cause them to take (or not take) specific actions that aid
computer-security defenses.” We adapt this definition and add “confusion” as one
of goals of using deceit (the expression of things that are not true) in computer
system protection, as we will discuss later in section 4.6.3. Therefore, the definition
of defensive computer deception we will use throughout this dissertation is
“Planned actions taken to mislead and/or confuse attackers and to thereby
cause them to take (or not take) specific actions that aid computer-security
defenses”
4.2 Limitations of Isolated Use of Deception
Honeypot-based tools are a valuable technique used for the detection, prevention,
and response to cyber attacks as we discussed in section 3.7.1. Nevertheless, those
techniques su↵er from the following major limitations:
• As the prefix honey-* indicates, for such techniques to become useful, the ad-
versary needs to interact with them. Attackers and malware are increasingly
becoming sophisticated and their ability to avoid honeypots is increasing [27].
• Assuming we manage to lure the attacker into our honeypot, we need to be
able to continuously deceive them that they are in the real system. Chen et
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al. study such a challenge and show that some malware, such as polymorphic
malware, not only detects honeypots, but also changes its behavior to deceive
the honeypot itself [27]. In this situation, attackers are in a position where
they have the ability to conduct counter-deception activities by behaving in a
manner that is di↵erent than how would they do in a real environment.
• To learn about attackers’ objectives and attribute them, we need them to in-
teract with the honeypot systems. However, with a high-interaction honeypot
there is a risk that attackers might exploit the honeypot itself and use it as
a pivot point to compromise other, more sensitive, parts of the organization’s
internal systems. Of course, with correct separation and DMZs we can alleviate
the damage, but many organizations consider the risk intolerable and simply
avoid using such tools.
• As honeypots are totally “fake systems” many tools currently exist to identify
whether the current system is a honeypot or not [27, 79]. This fundamental
limitation is intrinsic in their design.
4.3 The Role of Deception
Most of the previous deception techniques work in isolation and independently of
other parts of information systems. This design decision has been partly driven by
the security risks associated with honeypots. We argue that intelligently augmenting
our systems with interacting deception-based techniques can significantly enhance our
security and gives us the ability to achieve deception in depth.
If we examine table 2.1, we can see that we can apply deception at every stage of
the cyber kill-chain, allowing us to break the chain and possibly attribute attackers.
At the reconnaissance stage we can lure adversaries by creating a site and having
honey-activities that mimic a real-world organization. As an example, an organization
can subscribe with a number of cloud service providers and have honey activities in
place while monitoring any activities that signal external interest. Another example
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to address the problem of spear-phishing, we can create a number of fake personas
and disseminate their information online while monitoring their contact details to
detect any probing activities; some commercial security firms currently do this.
4.3.1 Advantages of Using Deception in Computer Defenses
Reginald Jones, the British scientific military intelligence scholar, concisely artic-
ulated the relationship between security and deception. He referred to security as a
“negative activity, in that you are trying to stop the flow of clues to an opponent” and
it needs its other counterpart, namely deception, to have a competitive advantage in
a conflict [83]. He refers to deception as the “positive counterpart to security” that
provides false clues to be fed to the opponents.
By intelligently using deceptive techniques systems defenders can mislead and/or
confuse attackers enhancing their defensive capabilities over time. By exploiting at-
tackers’ unquestioned trust of computer system responses, system defenders can gain
an edge and position themselves a step ahead of compromise attempts. In general,
deception-based security defenses bring the following unique advantages to computer
systems:
1. Increases the entropy of leaked information about targeted systems during com-
promise attempts.
When a computer system is targeted, the focus is usually only on protecting and
defending it. With deception, extra defensive measures can be taken by feed-
ing attackers false information that will, in addition to defending the targeted
system, cause intruders to make wrong actions/inactions and draw incorrect
conclusions. With the increased spread of APT attacks and government/corpo-
rate espionage threats such techniques can be e↵ective.
When we inject false information we cause some confusion for the adversaries
even if they have already obtained some sensitive information; the injection of
negative information can degrade and devalue the correct information obtained
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by adversaries. Heckman and her team, from MITRE, conducted an experiment
between a red and a blue team using deception techniques, where they reported
interesting results [74]. They developed a tool, referred to as “Blackjack,” that
dynamically copies an internal state of a production server – after removing
sensitive information and injecting deceit – and then directs adversaries to that
instance [74]. Even after the red team successfully attacked and infiltrated
the blue systems and obtained sensitive information, the blue team injected
some false information in their system that led the red team to devalue the
information they had obtained, believing that the new values were correct.
2. Increases the information obtained from compromise attempts.
Many security controls are designed to create a boundary around computer
systems automatically stopping any illicit access attempts. This is becoming
increasingly challenging as such boundaries are increasingly blurring partly as
a result of recent trends such as “consumerization”1 [73]. Moreover, because of
the low cost on the adversaries’ side, and the existence of many automated ex-
ploitation tools, attackers can continuously probe computer systems until they
find a vulnerability to infiltrate undetected. During this process, systems de-
fenders learn nothing about the intruders’ targets. Ironically, this makes the
task of defending a computer system harder after every unsuccessful attack.
We conjecture that incorporating deception-based techniques can enhance our
understanding of compromise attempts using the illicit probing activity as op-
portunity to enhance our understanding of the threats and, therefore, better
protect our systems over time.
3. Give defenders an edge in the OODA loop.
The OODA loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) is a cyclic process
model, proposed by John Boyd, by which an entity reacts to an event [20]. The
1This term is widely used to refer to enterprises’ employees bringing their own digital devises and
using them to access the companies’ resources.
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victory in any tactical conflict requires executing this loop in a manner that
is faster than the opponent. The act of defending a computer system against
persistent attacks can be viewed as an OODA loop race between the attacker
and the defender. The winner of this conflict is the entity that executes this
loop faster. One critical advantage of deception-based defenses is that they
give defenders an edge in such a race as they actively feed adversaries deceptive
information that a↵ects their OODA loop, more specifically the “observe” and
“orient” stages of the loop. Furthermore, slowing the adversary’s process gives
defenders more time to decide and act. This is especially crucial in the situation
of surprise, which is a common theme in digital attacks.
4. Increases the risk of attacking computer systems from the adversaries’ side.
Many current security controls focus on preventing the actions associated with
illicit attempts to access computer systems. As a result, intruders are using this
accurate negative feedback as an indication that their attempts have been de-
tected. Subsequently, they withdraw and use other, more stealthy, methods of
infiltration. Incorporating deceit in the design of computer systems introduces
a new possibility that adversaries need to account for; namely that they have
been detected and currently deceived. This new possibility can deter attackers
who are not willing to take the risk of being deceived, and further analyzed. In
addition, such technique gives systems’ defenders the ability to use intruders’
infiltration attempts to their advantage by actively feeding them false informa-
tion.
4.4 Related Work of Modeling the Use of Deception in Security
Cohen et al. was one of the first to develop a model for using deception in computer
defenses [34]. They provided a general overview of human and computer deception.
Their work was motivated by the deception toolkit (DTK), discussed in section 3.7,
and discusses how a system can be designed to deceive attackers.
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Game theory has been used to study some deception-based techniques. Carroll
and Grosu presented an analysis of using deception for network security modeling the
problem as a signaling game [24]. They modeled the interaction between the defender
and the attacker where defenders can deploy a honeypot or a normal system; or they
can camouflage any of the two. The authors developed an equilibrium of defenders
action. In addition, Garg and Grosu analyzed the deception of honeynets using game
theory to provide defenders the best strategy in deploying deception [62].
Rowe modeled attackers interaction with a computer system and discussed how
can we plan a deceptive “resource denial” response e↵ectively [130]. Such responses
are designed to waste adversaries’ time and resources while alerting systems’ defenders
of potential attacks.
4.5 A Framework for Integrating Deception-Based Defenses
In this section, we present a framework that can be used to plan and integrate
deception in computer security defenses. Many computer defenses that use deception
were ad-hoc attempts to incorporate deceptive elements in their design. We show
how our framework can be used to incorporate deception in many parts of a computer
system and discuss how we can use such techniques e↵ectively. A successful deception
should present plausible alternative(s) to the truth and these should be designed to
exploit specific adversaries’ biases, as discussed in section 3.4.
The framework discussed in this section is based on the general deception model
discussed by Bell and Whaley in [11]. There are three general phases of any deceptive
component; namely planning, implementing and integrating, and finally monitoring
and evaluating. In the following sections we discuss each one of those phases in more
detail. The framework is depicted in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1.: Framework to Incorporate Deception in Computer Security Defenses
4.5.1 Planning Deception
There are six essential steps to planning a successful deception-based defensive
component. The first, and often neglected, step is specifying exactly the strategic
goals the defender wants to achieve. Simply augmenting a computer system with
honey-like components, such as honeypots and honeyfiles, gives us a false sense that
we are using deception to lie to adversaries. It is essential to detail exactly what are
the goals of using any deception-based mechanisms. As an example, it is significantly
di↵erent to set up a honeypot for the purpose of simply capturing malware than
having a honeypot to closely monitor APT-like attacks.
After specifying the strategic goals of the deception process, we need to specify –
in the second step of the framework – how the target (attacker) should react to the
deception. This determination is critical to the long-term success of any deceptive
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process. For example the work of Zhao and Mannan, discussed in section 3.7.3, deceive
attackers launching online guessing attacks into believing that they have found a
correct username and password. The strategic goal of this deception process is to
direct an attacker to a “fake” account thus wasting their resources and monitoring
their activities to learn about their objectives. It is crucial to analyze how the target
should react after the successful “fake” login. The obvious reaction is that the attacker
would continue to laterally move in the target system, attempting further compromise.
However, an alternative response is that the attacker ceases the guessing attack and
reports to its command and control that a successful username/password pair has
been found. In consideration of the second alternative we might need to maintain
the username/password pair of the fake account and keep that account information
consistent for future targeting.
Moreover, part of this second step is to specify how we desire an attacker to react
such that we may try to influence his perception and thus lead him to the desired
reaction. Continuing with the example in the previous paragraph, if we want the
attacker to login again so we have more time to monitor and setup a fake account,
we might cause an artificial network disconnection that will cause the target to login
again.
Adversaries’ Biases
Deception-based defenses are useful tools that have been shown to be e↵ective in
many human conflicts. Their e↵ectiveness relies on the fact that they are designed
to exploit specific biases in how people think, making them appear to be plausible
but false alternatives to the hidden truth, as discussed in section 3.4. These mecha-
nisms give defenders the ability to learn more about their attackers, reduce indirect
information leakages in their systems, and provide an advantage with regard to their
defenses.
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Step 3 of planning deception is to understand the attackers’ biases. As discussed
in section 3.4, biases are a cornerstone component to the success of any deception-
based mechanisms. The deceiver needs to present a plausible deceit to successfully
deceive and/or confuse an adversary. If attackers decide that such information is not
plausible they are more inclined to reject it, or at least raise their suspicions about the
possibility of currently being deceived. When the defender determines the strategic
goal of the deception and the desired reactions by the target, he needs to investigate
the attacker’s biases to decide how best to influence the attacker’s perception to
achieve the desired reactions.
One example of using biases in developing some deceptive computer defenses is
using the “confirmation bias” to lead adversaries astray and waste their time and
resources. Confirmation bias is defined as “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in
ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” [110].
A computer defender can use this bias in responding to a known adversarial probing
of the system’s perimeter. Traditional security defenses are intended to detect and
prevent such activity, by simply dropping such requests or actively responding with an
explicit denial. Taking this a step further by exploiting some pre-existing expectation,
i.e. the confirmation bias, we might provide a response that the system is being taken
down for some regular maintenance or as a result of some unexpected failure. With
such a response, the defender manages to prevent illicit activity, provide a pause to
consider next steps for the defender, and perhaps waste the adversary’s time as they
wait or investigate other alternatives to continue their attacks.
Cultural biases play an important role in designing deceptive responses, as dis-
cussed in section 3.4.2. For example, some studies found relationships between
the type of computer attacks and the culture/country from which the attack orig-
inated [135].
In computing, the conjunction fallacy bias, discussed in section 3.4.4, can be
exploited by presenting the deception story as a conjunction of multiple detailed
components. For example, if deceivers want to misinform an attacker probing their
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system by creating an artificial network failure, instead of simply blocking these
attempts, it is better to give a longer story. A message that says “Sorry the network
is down for some scheduled network maintenance. Please come back in three hours”
is more plausible than simply saying “The network is down” and thus more likely to
be believed.
Creating the Deception Story
After analyzing attackers’ biases the deceiver needs to decide exactly what com-
ponents to simulate/dissimulate; namely step 4 of the framework in figure 4.1.
In figure 4.2 we provide an overview of the di↵erent system components where
deception can be applied, exploiting the attacker’s biases to achieve the desired reac-
tion. Overall, deceit can be injected into the functionality and/or state of our systems.
We give a discussion of each one of these categories below and present some examples.
Figure 4.2.: Computer Systems Components Where Deception Can Be Integrated
With
System’s Decisions. We can apply deception to the di↵erent decisions any com-
puter system makes. As an example, Zhao and Mannan work, discussed in section
3.7.3, apply deception at the system’s authentication decision where they deceive
adversaries by giving them access to “fake” accounts in the cases of online guessing
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attacks. Another system’s decision we can use concerns firewalls. Traditionally, we
add firewall rules that prevent specific IP addresses from interacting with our sys-
tems after detecting that they are sources of some attacks. We consider this another
form of data leakage in accordance with the discussion of Zhao and Mannan in [177].
Therefore, we can augment firewalls by applying deception to their decisions by pre-
senting adversaries with plausible responses other than simply denying access. We
discuss this further in the design of the deceptive server “Deceptiver” in chapter 7.
System’s Software and Services. Reconnaissance is the first stage of any attack
on any computing system, as identified in the kill-chain model [80]. Providing fake
systems and services has been the main focus of honeypot-based mechanisms. Hon-
eypots, discussed in section 3.7.1, are intended to provide attackers with a number
of fake systems running fake services. Moreover, we can use deception to mask the
identities of our current existing software/services. The work of Murphy et al., dis-
cussed in section 3.7.3, recommended the use of operating system obfuscation tools
for Air Force computer defenses [107].
System’s Internal and Public Data. A honeyfile, discussed in section 3.7.2, is
an example of injecting deceit into the system’s internal data. It can be applied to the
raw data in computer systems, e.g., files and directories, or to the administrative data
that are used to make decisions and/or monitor the system’s activities. An example
applying deception to the administrative data can be seen in the honeywords proposal,
discussed in section 3.7.3. Deceit can also be injected into the public data about our
systems. Wang et al. made the case of disseminating public data about some “fake”
personnel for the purpose of catching attacks such as spear phishing [165]. Cli↵ Stoll
did this during the story of his book [146]. In addition, we note that this category also
includes o✏ine stored data such as back-ups that can be used as a focus of deception.
In chapter 6, we present a scheme that applies deception to system’s administrative
data to enhance the security of users’ credentials.
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System’s Activity. Di↵erent activities within a system are considered as one
source of information leakage. For example, tra c flow analysis has long been studied
as a means for attackers to deduce information [60]. Additionally, a system’s activity
has been used as a means of distinguishing between a “fake” and a real system [27].
We can intelligently inject some data about activities into our system to influence
attackers’ perception and, therefore, their reactions.
System’s Weaknesses. Adversaries probe computer systems trying to discover
and then exploit any weakness (vulnerability). Often, these adversaries come prepared
with a list of possible vulnerabilities and then try to use them until they discover
something that works. Traditional security mechanisms aid adversaries by quickly and
promptly responding back to any attempt to exploit fixed, i.e. patched, vulnerabilities
with a denial response. This response leaks information that these vulnerabilities are
known and fixed. When we inject deceit into this aspect of our systems we can
misinform adversaries by confusing them – by not giving them a definitive answer
whether the exploit has succeeded – or by deceiving them by making it appear as if
the vulnerability has been exploited.
System’s Damage Assessment. This relates to the previous component; how-
ever, the focus here is to make the attacker perceive that the damage caused is more
or less than the real damage. We may want the adversary to believe that he has
caused more damage than what has happened so as to either stop the attack or cause
the attacker to become less aggressive. This is especially important in the context of
the OODA loop discussed earlier in section 4.3.1. We might want the adversary to
believe that he has caused less damage if we want to learn more about the attacker
by prompting a more aggressive attack.
System’s Performance. Influencing the attacker’s perception of system’s perfor-
mance may put the deceiver at an advantageous position. This has been seen in
the use of sticky honeypots and tarpits, discussed in section 3.7.1, that are intended
58
to slow the adversary’s probing activity. Also, tarpits have been used to throttle
the spread of network malware. In a related fashion, Somayaji et al. proposed a
method to deal with intrusions by slowing the operating system response to a series
of anomalous system calls [77].
System’s Configurations. Knowledge of the configuration of the defender’s sys-
tems and networks is often of great importance to the success of the adversary’s
attack. In the lateral movement phase of the kill-chain adversarial model, attackers
need to know how and where to move to act on their targets. In the red-teaming
experiment by Cohen and Koike, discussed in section 3.7.3, they deceived adversaries
to attack the targeted system in a particular sequence from a networking perspective.
After deciding which components to simulate/dissimulate, we can apply one of
Bell and Whaley’s techniques discussed earlier. We give an example of how each one
of these techniques can be used in the following paragraphs.
• Using Masking – This has been used o↵ensively where attackers hide potentially
damaging scripts in the background of the page by matching the text color with
the background color. When we apply hiding to software and services, we can
hide the fact that we are running some specific services when we detect a probing
activity. For example, when we receive an SSH connection request from a known
bad IP address we can mask our SSHd demon and respond as if the service is
not working or as if it is encountering an error.
• Using Repackaging – In several cases it might be easier to “repackage” data as
something else. In computing, repackaging has long been used to attack com-
puter users. The infamous cross-site scripting (XSS) attack uses this technique
where an attacker masks a dangerous post as harmless to steal the user’s cookies
when they view such post. Another example can be seen in the cross-site request
forgery (XSRF) attacks where an adversary deceives a user into visiting some
innocuous looking web pages that silently instruct the user’s browser to engage
in some unwanted activities. In addition, repackaging techniques are used by
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botnet Trojans that repackage themselves as anti-virus software to deceive users
into installing them so an attacker can take control of their machines. From the
defensive standpoint, a repackaging act can be seen in HoneyFiles, discussed in
section 3.7.2, that repackage themselves as normal files while acting internally
as silent alarms to system administrators when accessed.
• Using Dazzling – This is considered to be the weakest form of dissimulation,
where we confuse the targeted objects with others. An example of using dazzling
can be seen in the “honeywords” proposal, discussed in section 3.7.3. The
scheme confuses each user’s hashed password with an extra (N   1) hashes
of other, similar, passwords dazzling an attacker who obtains the credentials
database.
• Using Mimicking – In computing, phishing attacks are a traditional example of
an unwanted deceiving login page mimicking a real website login. An attacker
takes advantage of users by deceiving them into giving up their credentials
by appearing as the real site. From a defensive perspective, we can apply
mimicking to software and services by making our system mimic the responses
of a di↵erent system, e.g., respond as if we are running a version of Windows
XP while we are running Windows 7. This will waste attackers’ resources in
trying to exploit our Windows 7 machine thinking it is Windows XP, as well as
increase the opportunity for discovery. This is seen in the work of Murphy et
al. in operating system obfuscation discussed in section 3.7.3.
• Using Inventing – Mimicking requires the results to look like something else;
when this is not easy to achieve invention can be used instead. This technique
has seen the most research in the application of deception to computer security
defenses. Honeypots, discussed in section 3.7.1, are one prominent example of
inventing a number of nodes in an organizations with the goal of deceiving an
attacker that they are real systems.
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• Using Decoying – This technique is used to attract adversaries’ attention away
from the most valuable parts of a computer system. Honeypots are used, in some
cases, to deceive attackers by showing that these systems are more vulnerable
than other parts of the organization and therefore capture attackers’ attention.
This can be seen in the work of Carroll and Grosu [24].
Figure 4.3.: Creating Deceit
After deciding which deceptive technique to use we need to analyze the patterns
attackers perceive and then apply one or more of those techniques to achieve the
desired reactions.
Deceit is an active manipulation of reality. We argue that reality can be manip-
ulated in one of three general ways, as depicted in figure 4.3-a. We can manufacture
reality, alter reality, and/or hide reality. This can be applied to any one of the
components we discussed in the previous section.
In addition, reality manipulation is not only to be applied to the existence of
the data in our systems — it can be applied to two other features of the data. As
represented in figure 4.3-b, we can manipulate the reality with respect to the existence
of data, nature of the data, and/or value of the data. The existence of the data can be
manipulated not only for the present but also when the data has been created. This
can be achieved for example with the manipulation of time stamps. With regard
to the nature of the data, we can manipulate the size of the data, such as in the
example of endless files, discussed in section 2.1.3, when and why the data has been
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created. The value of the data can also be manipulated. For example, log files
are usually considered important data that adversaries try to delete to cover their
tracks. Making a file appear as a log file will increase its value from the adversary’s
perspective.
At this step, it is crucial to specify exactly when the deception process should
be activated. It is usually important that legitimate users’ activity should not be
hindered by the deceptive components. Optimally, the deception should only be
activated in the case of malicious interactions. However, we recognize that this may
not always be possible as the lines between legitimate and malicious activities might
be blurry. We argue that there are many defensive measures that can apply some
deceptive techniques in place of the traditional denial-based defenses that can make
these tradeo↵s.
Feedback Channels and Risks
Deception-based defenses are not a single one-time defensive measure, as is the
case with many advanced computer defenses. It is essential to monitor these defenses,
and more importantly measure the impact they have on attackers’ perceptions and
actions. This is step 5 in the deception framework. We recognize that if an attacker
detects that he is being deceived, he can use this to his advantage to make a counter-
deception reaction. To successfully monitor such activities we need to clearly identity
the deception channels that can and should be used to monitor and measure any
adversary’s perceptions and actions.
In the sixth and final step before implementation and integration, we need to
consider that deception may introduce some new risks for which organizations need
to account. For example, the fact that adversaries can launch a counter-deception
operation is a new risk that needs to be analyzed. In addition, an analysis needs to
done on the e↵ects of deception on normal users’ activities. The defender needs to ac-
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curately identify potential risks associated with the use of such deceptive components
and ensure that residual risks are accepted and well identified.
4.5.2 Implementing and Integrating Deception
Many deception-based mechanisms are implemented as a separate disjoint com-
ponent from real production systems, as in the honeypot example. With the ad-
vancement of many detection techniques used by adversaries and malware, attackers
can detect whether they are in real system or a “fake” system [27], and then change
behavior accordingly, as we discussed in section 4.2. A successful deception operation
needs to be integrated with the real operation. The honeywords proposal, discussed
in section 3.7.3, is an example of this tight integration as there is no obvious way to
distinguish between a real and a “fake” password.
4.5.3 Monitoring and Evaluating the Use of Deception
Identifying and monitoring the feedback channels is critical to the success of any
deception operation/component. Hesketh discussed three general categories of signals
that can be used to know whether a deception was successful or not [75]:
1. The target acts in the wrong time and/or place.
2. The target acts in a way that is wasteful of his resources.
3. The target delays acting or stop acting at all.
Defenders need to monitor all the feedback channels identified in step 5 of the
framework. We note that there are usually three general outputs from the use of any
deceptive components. The adversary might (i) believe it, where the defender usually
sees one of the three signs of a successful deception highlighted above, (ii) suspect
it or (iii) disbelieve it. When an attacker suspects that a deceptive component is
being used, we should make the decision whether to increase the level of deception or
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stop the deceptive component to avoid exposure. Often deception can be enhanced by
presenting more (and perhaps, true) information that makes the deception story more
plausible. This can be included as a feedback loop in the framework. This observation
should be analyzed by the defender to review his analysis of the attacker’s biases, (i.e.,
step 3), and the methodology used to create the deceit (i.e., step 4). Furthermore,
the deceiver might employ multiple levels of deception based on the interaction with
the attacker during the attack.
When an attacker disbelieves the presented deceit we need to have an active mon-
itoring and a detailed plan of action. This should be part the sixth step of planning
in our framework where risks are assessed. In addition, during our discussions with
security practitioners many have indicated that some attackers often act aggressively
when they realize that they have been deceived. This can be one of the signals that
is used during the monitoring stage to measure attackers’ reaction of the deceptive
component. In addition, this behavior can be used as one of the biases to be exploited
by other deceptive mechanisms that may focus on deceiving the attacker about the
system’s damage assessment, as discussed in section 4.5.1.
4.6 Deception and Related Concepts
4.6.1 Kerckho↵’s Principle and Deception
Deception always involves two basic steps, hiding the real and showing the false,
as we discussed earlier. This, at first glance, contradicts the widely believed misinter-
pretation of Kerckho↵’s principle; “no security through obscurity.” A more correct
English translation of Kerckho↵’s principle is the one provided by Petitcolas in [117];
“The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy
without causing trouble.”
The misinterpretation leads some security practitioners to believe that any “ob-
scurity” is ine↵ective, while this is not the case. Hiding a system from an attacker or
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having a secret password does increase the work factor for the attacker — until the
deception is detected and defeated. So long as the security does not materially de-
pend on the obscurity, the addition of misdirection and deceit provides an advantage.
It is therefore valuable for a designer to include such mechanisms in a comprehensive
defense, with the knowledge that such mechanisms should not be viewed as primary
defenses.
In any system design there are three levels of viewing a system’s behavior and
responses to service requests:
• Truthful. In such systems, the processes will always respond to any input with
full “honesty.” In other words, the system’s responses are always “trusted” and
accurately represent the internal state of the machine. For example, when the
user asks for a particular network port, a truthful system responds with either a
real port number or denies the request giving the specific reason of such denial.
• Naively Deceptive. In such systems, the processes attempt to deceive the inter-
acting user by crafting an artificial response. However, if the user knows the
deceptive behavior, e.g. by analyzing the previous deceptive response used by
the system, the deception act becomes useless and will only alert the user that
the system is trying to deceive her. For example, the system can designate a
specific port that is used for deceptive purposes. When the attacker asks for a
port, without carrying the appropriate permissions, this deceptive port is sent
back.
• Intelligently Deceptive. In this case, the systems “deceptive behavior” is in-
distinguishable from the normal behavior even if the user has previously inter-
acted with the system. For example, an intelligently-deceptive system responds
to unauthorized port listening requests the same as a normal allowed request.
However, extra actions are taken to monitor the port, alert the system adminis-
trators, and/or sandbox the listening process to limit the damage if the process
downloads malicious content.
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The mechanisms discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7 are designed to be intelli-
gently deceptive. In other words, an adversary who know the design details of
these security controls, i.e. read this dissertation, will not be able to easily dis-
tinguish between real and fake information without expending extra time and
computation.
4.6.2 Deception and Hacking Back
These two terms are orthogonal to each other, however, they are often mixed
together driving the security community away from the use of deceptive techniques, as
discussed earlier. Hacking back is an activity that involves the use of many techniques,
and deception can be one of those techniques. The confusion between the two terms
is partially driven by the abundant use of deception in war and military conflicts to
launch o↵ensive attacks. Moreover, the extensive use of deception by adversaries,
and the negative connotations associated with it, contributed to the creation of the
mental model that using deception is equal to hacking back.
4.6.3 Deception and Consistency
Most of the work in using deception is designed to provide plausible and consistent
alternatives to the truth to adversaries. Neagoe and Bishop argue that deception can
still be achieved without maintaining consistency [109]. Moreover, they postulate
that inconsistency is favorable in some scenarios. When inconsistent deception is
used, the goal of deception focuses of “discombobulate and disorient” – i.e. confuse
– adversaries [109]. This wastes attackers time where they try to reason about the
system’s behavior and decide which perception reflects the reality of the computer
system. This is why we added “confusion” in the definition of deception in computer
security in section 4.1.
We argue that inconsistency can be an integral part of any deceptive-based tech-
niques. Maintaining a fully consistent “fake” image of a sophisticated computer
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system may not be an easy task especially when considering that there are many
ways to access the sought after data. If the sole goal of security administrators is
to confuse the attacker, then the extra cost associated with implementing consistent
deception is not needed. In addition, inconsistent deception can be used as a tactic
when realizing that the consistent “fake” image can no longer be maintained.
4.6.4 Deception and Abstraction
It is crucial to distinguish between the act of deceit and abstraction. Although
the line is fuzzy, Adar et al. suggests a simple test to distinguish between the two [1].
In abstraction, unlike deception, the user’s behavior will remain largely unchanged
if the user knows the real truth. In addition, we point out that deception always
requires the act of simulation and dissimulation as discussed in section 3.1. However,
abstraction only involves simulation, where we try to show a simpler version of the
reality, but we do not actively dissimulate the truth.
Finally, another fundamental di↵erence between deception and abstraction is the
di↵erence in their ultimate goals. Abstraction aids humans interacting with com-
puters to make them better reason about these systems and their behavior. This
is usually achieved by hiding complexities and suggesting useful analogies. In con-
trast, deception’s goal is to corrupt such reasoning and influence humans perception
to reach false conclusions about the systems they are interacting with.
4.7 Applying the Framework
4.7.1 To Previous Uses of Deception
In this section, we apply our framework to some of previous uses deception to
enhance security. We discuss how the framework captures the design and implemen-
tation of those tools. Moreover, we highlight some of the missing components in the
design that are identified by the framework.
67
Rowe developed a deceptive security tool that sends deceptive responses when it
detects a real attack. We will take his work discussed in [128] and [127] and apply
it to the framework discussed in this chapter. Rowe points out that the goal of his
proposed deceptive tool is to “waste the attacker’s resources while permitting time
to organize a better defense,” which is the first step in our framework. In addition,
his goal is to consistently deceive attackers while interacting with the security tool.
To achieve this goal, he implicitly discusses exploiting the expectedness bias – i.e.
attackers expect computers to tell the truth. Rowe did not explicitly discuss how he
desires the adversary to react to his system other than simply believing, omitting the
second step of the framework. We argue that not explicitly discussing adversaries’
desired reaction leads the design of such tools to not realize their goals. When we do
not explicitly specify what we consider success when an adversary interacts with the
deceptive security tools, it becomes harder to quantify their value or how they can
be integrated e↵ectively with other security mechanisms.
Matching the fourth step of the framework, Rowe presents how this tool is going to
create the deceit. Figure 4.4 shows the di↵erent system components where deception
has been applied. In all of those, the tool manufactures a reality and presents to the
adversary. Rowe explains in detail how deceit is created in each one of these examples
in [128].
Figure 4.4.: System Components Used to Create Deceit in Rowe’s Work
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After the creation of deceit, we found that Rowe did not explicitly discuss the
feedback channels that should be monitored to observe the attacker’s reaction. He
implicitly touches on this concept when investigating the plausibility of the created
deceit and how to maintain it. Moreover, his work does not discuss the additional
risks that could be introduced by the use of such tools, if any, and possible counter
measures.
Rowe examines how to integrate this security tool into a computer system. He uses
a Bayesian belief update model to estimate the attacker’s belief and alter the system’s
behavior. He generates a Markov graph by running a predicative-calculus planning
specification hundreds of times using some probabilistic estimations obtained from a
number of questionnaires. The system moves to di↵erent states based on the input
received at every stage.
Another example we will discuss in this section to apply our framework is the
work of Bowen et al. to mitigate the insider threat [19]. They integrated a decoy
documents distributor and a mechanism to monitor whether the insider accessed the
decoys with behavioral based host-based sensors. The authors clearly stated that
the goal is to “confuse and confound attackers.” After that, Bowen’s group points
out that their design would lead an adversary to react by expending more e↵ort into
distinguishing between the real and fake information. Even though they discussed
how they desire the adversary to react, there was no discussion of other possible
ways an attacker might react. This missing part of the second part of our framework
causes the designer of deceptive defenses to focus on what they desire and possibly
eliminate other undesired reactions by the adversary which could lead to additional
risks. Additionally, the researchers present no discussion of any biases their tool is
exploiting to make the deceit believable.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the two system components Bowen et al. applied deception
to in their work [19]. They embedded honeytokens, discussed in 3.7.2, in the tar-
geted system and these are internal administrative information. In addition, they
distributed a number of beacons that alert a remote server when accessed and mark-
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ers in every file to distinguish between real and fake file by host-base sensors. These
two deceptive techniques apply deception to the raw internal data. To create the
deceit, Bowen and his group manufacture reality, in the case of honeytokens, and
alter reality, in the case of the beacons and documents markers.
Figure 4.5.: System Components Used to Create Deceit in Bowen et al. Work
Bowen et al. system monitors the deceptive components they have in place in
two ways: a beacon calling back to their SONAR server, or using the host-based
sensor. The only side-e↵ect they discuss is the issue of false positives and how to go
about reducing them. In addition, the researchers discuss generically how they would
integrate their controls with an existing computer system. However, they defer the
details to future research. Finally, Bowen and his group do not investigate the case
where the adversary suspects the use of deception. It could be argued that because
their goal is to require an adversary to expend more time in discerning the deceit
from the truth, there is no need to consider a suspecting attacker as a separate case.
In this section, we discussed how our framework captures all the details on two
previous work of deception; namely the work of Rowe [128] and Bowen et al. [19].
We showed that every part of the design of these two tools can be captured in using
our framework. More importantly, we point out to some of the omitted steps in the
design of these two security control that were highlighted in our framework. We show
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that the functionality of these tools could be improved if all steps in the framework
were addressed explicitly.
4.7.2 To the Work in This Dissertation – A Case Study
In this section we present a case study of a web application to show how we can
use the framework presented in this chapter and the tools in the next three chapters
to enhance its security. In our discussion, we are assuming that this web application is
developed to provide customers with a peer-to-peer payment service. Each customer
has an account and she needs to login using her username and password whenever
she needs to use the service.
As in common web applications, traditional security controls are used to ensure
their security. In our case study, we use a firewall that only allows SSL/TLS con-
nections to port 443. This firewall is configured to block all known bad requests
using common blacklists. In addition, customers need to login to their accounts be-
fore making any requests. Each customer has a unique username and a password.
Locally, at the application server, all user’s passwords are salted and hashed. The
overall structure of the web application and its security is depicted in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6.: Web Application Case Study
Despite all these protection mechanisms, customers occasionally receive phishing
emails asking them to urgently login to the service or they risk loosing their account
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balances. Additionally, support emails posted publicly on the public webpages are
often used by adversaries. Support teams often receive malicious attachments, deliv-
ered through a spear phishing email, as a mean to compromise internal servers. In
addition, operators are suspect that they are targeted by some advanced attacks to
steal users’ credentials, similar to the ones that compromised other companies [63].
All these threats are illustrated in figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7.: Web Application Generic Threats
Using the framework discussed in this section, we will plan and integrate a number
of deceptive security mechanisms to enhance the security of this web application.
Table 4.1 summaries the result of using the framework discussed earlier in this chapter.
The overall design of augmenting the deception-based defenses with the web ap-
plication is illustrated in figure 4.8. The covert deceptive communication channel,
discussed in chapter 5, is used to both limit the exposure of users’ passwords and
communicate the user’s context during authentication, e.g. whether the user is log-
ging in as a response to an email solicitation. Ersatzpasswords, presented in chapter
6, are deployed to detect password files compromise. In addition, the scheme elimi-
nates the possibility of password cracking without physical access to the application’s
server. Finally, Deceptiver (discussed in chapter 7) is used to disseminate deceptive
email addresses to catch any malware received as part of targeted attacks. Moreover,
deceptive responses will be sent when an adversary tries to probe the web application
instead of simply blocking those attempts.
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Figure 4.8.: Web Application Deception-Based Defenses
Throughout the next three chapters, we discuss the design of each one of those
three deceptive defenses. We discuss the threat, or threats, the proposed defensive
mechanism is designed to address. In addition, we present a security analysis of the
presented solution.
4.8 Chapter Summary
In everyday security, we often use deception, and computer security is no di↵er-
ent. In this chapter, we presented a discussion of the major limitations of previous
work. After that, we examined the major advantages deception-based security tools
have in comparison to traditional security mechanisms. Moreover, we presented a
novel framework for planning and integrating deception into computing defenses. We
discussed how a defender should monitor and evaluate the success of any such mech-
anisms. In addition, we provided some details of how defenders should integrate
deception into their computer security defenses, and how they can create plausible
alternatives to reality, thus misinforming the attackers and wasting their resources.
Finally, we discussed a case study of how the framework can be used and give a brief
overview of the relationships with the next three chapters.
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5 DECEPTIVE COVERT CHANNEL
A recent American Banking Association (ABA) reported 62% of customers named
online banking as their preferred banking method, a substantial rise from 36% in
2010 [8]. At the same time, phishing has been an increasing threat — rising at an
alarming rate despite all the security mechanisms banks have in place [160]. Criminals
have been stealing money by means of exploiting the ubiquity of online banking. It is
estimated that the Zeus trojan alone resulted in $70 million dollars stolen from bank
accounts [124]. Many of the currently deployed two factor authentication schemes by
banks remain vulnerable to a number of attacks [97]. Zeus managed to bypass two
factor authentication schemes employed by banks [124]. Adham et al. presented a
prototype of a browser add-on that, even with two factor authentication, can suc-
cessfully manipulate banking transactions on-the-fly [2]. There is clearly a need to
improve the currently deployed schemes and address their shortcomings.
In this chapter we show how deception can be used to enhance the security of
passwords and authentication protocols. We introduce a deceptive covert channel that
conveys security information to the server, limits the exposure of users’ passwords,
and reduces the probability of them falling for phishing attacks. We start the chapter
by presenting an overview of the problem we are trying to solve and discussing some
of the relevant work in this area. After that, we present the details of our scheme with
an examination of its security. We then compare our scheme to previous proposals
that attempt to address the problem. We conclude the chapter by discussing some




In this chapter we are concerned with two general classifications of attacks against
client-server communication: man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks and man-in-the-
browser (MitB) attacks, as depicted in figure 5.1. In the former attack, the adversary
places herself in the communication channel between the user’s computer and the
server. End-to-end encryption schemes, such as SSL/TLS and IPSec, are intended
to address this so that the adversary cannot observe or alter the data in the commu-
nication channel. Attackers overcome this protection by forcing the user to have an
end-to-end encrypted channel with them instead of the real server, which is the case
in phishing attacks. In the latter attack, MitB, the attacker places herself between
the user and his computer by altering the interface (browser) and manipulates the
information displayed to the user in real-time. In this case even if the user employs
an end-to-end encryption scheme, such as SSL/TLS, the attacker accesses the infor-
mation when it is decrypted and can actively modify it before it is shown to the
user.
Figure 5.1.: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) vs. Man-in-the-Browser (MitB)
Adham et al. identified three main authentication schemes built on the tradi-
tional username and password in the area of online banking [2]. These schemes are
one-time password (OTP), partial transaction authentication, and full transaction
authentication. They have shown that OTP schemes such as HMAC-Based One-time
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Password (HOTP) [103] or Time-based One-time Password (TOTP) [104] are not se-
cure against active man-in-the-middle attacks (MitM) or man-in-the-browser (MitB)
attacks [2]. The former can be orchestrated using an active phishing attack, in which
the adversary immediately uses the stolen credentials to impersonate the user to the
bank, while the latter can be seen, as an example, in the Zeus trojan [15].
To address the problem of active MitB attacks, banks started to use transaction
authentication [2,49]. The Chip Authentication Program (CAP) introduced by many
banks requires a piece of dedicated hardware, and its protocol has a number of vul-
nerabilities [49]. A number of these hardware devices degrade the full transaction
authentication to only part of the transaction, as a consequence of usability chal-
lenges [2]. CrontoSign [50] is a full-transaction authentication scheme that utilizes a
smartphone to verify the information. The scheme requires a new phone registration
process that stores information on the phone, which makes the user vulnerable if her
phone is compromised or stolen. In addition, it ties the user to a specific phone, hin-
dering the usability of the scheme if the user does not have this particular phone at
transaction time. Moreover, this scheme only deals with transaction authentication,
and does not focus on providing enhanced user authentication.
Full transaction authentication gives a bank the ability to ask the user to confirm
her banking transaction to detect if MitB attacks are taking place and modifying
the transaction on-the-fly. It is an essential step to enhance the security of online
banking, as pointed out by Adham et al. [2]. The scheme we present in this chapter
achieves such goals without the need for additional hardware, as in CAP [49] or
hPIN/hTAN [93], or for a long term secret stored in the user’s smartphone. It also
has the other features mentioned earlier, of covertly conveying information to the
bank and supporting deceiving the adversary (honeyaccounts).
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5.1.2 Use of Smartphones
Clarke et al. were the first to suggest the use of a camera-based device when
connecting from untrusted computers [32]. While they did not explicitly discuss
the use of QR codes, their paper is considered seminal in this approach of en-
hancing authentication. A number of follow-on proposals presented other camera-
based schemes, using smartphones and other devices to improve authentication (see,
e.g., [72, 91, 92, 95, 105,145]).
Each one of these schemes su↵ers from one or more of the following shortcom-
ings: (i) requiring an extra piece of hardware; (ii) storage of long-term secret on the
smartphone; (iii) requiring a new registration process for associating the user’s bank
account with a particular smartphone; (iv) requiring the smartphone to have (net-
work or cellular) connectivity to carry out the authentication process. The scheme
we present in this chapter does not su↵er from any of these shortcomings.
5.1.3 Use of Deception and Covert Channels
As we discussed in chapter 4 the use of deception has shown a number of promising
results in aiding computer defenses. We incorporate deceptive elements in our scheme
in two ways: (i) an active MitM will be deceived such that it is forwarding the covert
messages back-and-forth that send an alarm to the service provider, (ii) we introduce
honeyaccounts in our scheme to dismantle an attack before it takes place, and to
gather information about the attacker’s goals, objectives, and resources.
The covert channel term was introduced by Lampson in 1973 and defined as
“channels not intended for information transfer at all” [89]. Such a channel has
been extensively studied as a security vulnerability that undermines the security of a
system and leaks out private information. The covert channel we are introducing in
this scheme is observed to “not carry information” by the adversary and is created by
design to enhance the overall security of the system. In this work we are overloading
the term, although we see the functionality as similar.
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Our method introduces the use of covert deceptive messages between the user
and/or her client and the service provider. One of the choices of covert message
is that the user is logging in as a response to an email; we discuss how this can be
achieved in the next section. If the bank has no record of a recent communication, that
response may trigger an enhanced defense, such as enabling read-only access. This
would directly address many forms of phishing. Other messages can be automatically
embedded by the user’s client, such as the use of a public network.
Honeyaccounts are fake bank accounts that banks can use to lure attackers and
deceive them into believing that they have successfully broken into the user’s account
at the bank. They provide an e↵ective mechanism to monitor attackers’ activities –
to learn who is targeting a certain bank, and learn the other accounts being used to
launder users’ stolen funds. This information is usually gathered by banks during the
forensic investigations following a money-theft episode (when it is too late to follow
the money trail). A user who covertly conveys to the bank her belief in the present
transaction o↵ers some hope of dismantling the financial infrastructure of a large-scale
phishing campaign before it does real damage. We all experience situations where we
know that an email is a phishing attempt, yet many of us limit our reaction to not
falling prey to it — it would be nice to have an easy-to-use mechanism for conveying
our belief and thereby triggering the deception mechanisms of the bank. The covert
communication we propose can achieve this.
5.2 Creating a Deceptive Covert Channel
This section discusses the technical specifications of our scheme. We show how to
perform the initial setup at the server and seamlessly enroll users. We also discuss
how the covert channel can be deployed within the authentication scheme. At the end
of this section, we discuss some the potential enhancements that our scheme brings
that can be incorporated in future work.
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5.2.1 Threat Model
There are many attacks against password-based authentication systems including
the following common attacks.
• Stolen Passwords. The security of password-based authentication systems fun-
damentally relies on the fact that each user’s password is only known to the
user alone. When an adversary obtains the user’s password he has the ability
to continuously impersonate the user to the server, without any of the two par-
ties noticing. Many attacks, such as phishing, keylogging, and shoulder-surfing
are centered on the goal of obtaining users’ passwords to gain unbounded access
to their accounts.
• Stolen Password Hashes File. An adversary who obtains the passwords hashes
file of many users can apply an o✏ine cracking process (such as dictionary
attacks) to retrieve the users’ passwords from their hashes.
• Poor/Easily Guessable Passwords. When the user chooses an easily guessable
password, an adversary can easily guess it and impersonate the user to the
server.
• Repeated Password Use. A person may use the same passwords across multiple
systems where a compromise against one system undermines the security of all
other systems.
Our focus in this chapter is to address the first attack scenario. In addition, it
provides an improvement to address the problem of cracking passwords. However,
the Ersatzpassword scheme presented in chapter 6 provides a strong protection of
password cracking as we will discuss later.
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5.2.2 Scheme’s Setup
As depicted in figure 5.2, there is no new registration required for bank customers,
and the bank can deploy the scheme either all at once, or progressively by selecting a
specific subset of their customers (in which case a user who prefers the old system can
easily be accommodated). In addition to a cryptographic one-way hash function H
and a cryptographic message authentication code such as HMAC, we use a one-way
accumulator function A whose output is to have the same number of bits as H (so
that the format of the bank server’s password file does not need to be modified – only
the nature of the bits stored changes).
As discussed by Fazio and Nicolosi, an accumulator function can be constructed
such that it behaves as a one-way function [55]. In addition to the usual one-way
property required of cryptographic hashes, a one-way accumulation of n items has
the properties that (i) the order of the accumulation does not matter (i.e., any two
permutations of the same n items give rise to the same result) [i.e. A(x1, x2) =
A(x2, x1)]; and (ii) given a new item/s and the accumulation of a previous item
A(x1), a new accumulation that includes the new item/s (as well as the old one)
can be e ciently obtained without needing to know the previous item (x1) which
equals A(x1, new items). To illustrate the second property using an example, if
we have the modular exponentiation of x1 (gx1) and we want to compute the new
accumulation including a new item x2, we compute this as gx
x2
1 = gx1⇤x2 . A real world
realization of such a function can be done by using a modular exponentiation where
the accumulation of x1 can be implemented as A(x1) = gx1 .
As the most common ways of implementing such an accumulator A function in-
volve modular exponentiation, it is typically the case that A(x, y) = A(x ⇤ y) (where
arithmetic is modular). In that case the security of A hinges on the Computational
Di e-Hellman assumption; that given A(x1) and A(x2) it is computationally in-
tractable to compute A(x1, x2) without knowing either x1 or x2. We give our presen-
tation assuming the existence of such an A, without going into any details of how it is
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actually implemented; our scheme depends only on A’s one-way property, its above-
mentioned order-independence, and its above-mentioned incremental accumulation.
Recall that a user’s entry in a traditional password file contains h = H(passwd
|| salt) and salt, where the purpose of the salt bits is to make a wholesale dictionary
attack against all users harder (but it does not make it harder to attack an individual
user, because the salt is stored in-the-clear). To switch to the new system, the bank
simply replaces h with A(h). This can handle users who select to remain in the
traditional username/password authentication (in the obvious way). But replacing h
by A(h) is essential for users who select to switch to our proposed smartphone-based
scheme, which we describe next.
5.2.3 Logging In
As usual, the login starts with the user entering her username on the computer.
We assume that the smartphone has the needed app (which knows nothing about the
user or the bank).
• The bank verifies that the username exists and, if so, generates a nonce R.
Then it computes and sends the following information to the user’s browser,
encoded in a QR-code (recall that a QR code is an optically machine-readable
two-dimensional barcode).
– A(R).
– HMACkey(A(R)) where key = A(A(h), R) = A(h,R).
– The user’s salt.
• The user scans the QR code using the smartphone app and inputs his password
to the smartphone. The app computes h0 = H(password || salt) and then
generates the HMAC key by computing A(A(R), h0) = A(R, h0) — the user’s
phone does not need a copy of R to make this computation. The HMAC is
recomputed locally and then the app verifies that the received HMAC matches
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Figure 5.2.: Protocol Run
the HMAC it computed. If the local check succeeds (meaning the user entered
the correct password and h == h0) the user moves into the next step of the
protocol – phase 5. If the check fails there are two scenarios for what comes
next; a safe case (branch a), and a decoy case (branch b). With the safe case
the scheme continues to phase 5; in the fail case the scheme jumps to phase
6. Before sending the MitM/MitB to a honeyaccount, the app might ask the
user to type their password three time to make sure that the failuer is not a
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result of a mistyped password. In the latter case, the app can simply skip the
covert messaging part if it detects a MitM/MitB impersonating the bank, and
either terminate or continue with a honeyaccount. In this case, the failure of
the HMAC verification can be treated as a special kind of covert message.
• In phase (5), the user is provided with the optional facility to covertly signal a
simple message to the server. This covert messaging mechanism enables di↵er-
ent behaviors from the current practice of “all-or-nothing” authentication and
access. We give users the ability to choose from a fixed set of possible messages
they could convey to the server; an example can be seen in figure 5.3. Giving
users the ability to convey their level of trust in the computing or network fa-
cilities being used, e.g., using a public or a friend’s computer, wireless network
at an airport, etc. Later in this section, we show how these messages can be
easily embedded in the code generated, in phase (6) of the scheme. Users can
use this same facility to covertly request a limited-access login (e.g., read-only),
in cases where they are following an email-solicited invitation to login to view
an “important message.” This covert message can alternatively be realized by
other means than the above, such as those proposed by Almeshekah et al. [3].
• In phase (6), a one-time code is generated by the smartphone by computing the
following accumulation;
y = A(A(R), h,msg1, ..,msgi) = A(R, h,msg1, ..,msgi)
The covert messages are conveyed by setting the bit of any covert message (of
the i possible messages) to one.
• In phase (7), the user types the generated code into the computer (copied from
the smartphone screen). To make the code readable we can use base64 encoding
and selecting the first n characters (the size of n is discussed later). Branch (a)
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Figure 5.3.: Sending a Covert Message
of the previous phase, i.e. the existence of networking facility in the phone, will
be discussed shortly.
• When the bank receives the code, in phase (8), it will check the validity of the
code and whether a covert message has been signaled or not. It first accumulates
into A(h) the item R, if it matches the y sent by the user sent then the login
succeeds (and the user did not convey a message), if it does not match y then
the bank further accumulates (in turn) every possible covert message until the
result matches y (or, if none matches, the login fails). In the safe case, if the
bank receives a valid code with no message, phase (9) of the protocol is reached.
However, if a message is sent, there are two possible options depending on the
message:
1. Take policy-specified action as per to the message conveyed before reaching
phase (9). This can incorporate a variety of policies including the require-
ment of carrying out additional authentication measures or o↵er limited
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access. This gives service providers the ability to implement risk-based
authentication and access control, and enforce a rich set of policies.
2. Redirect the authentication session to a honeyaccount and, optionally, no-
tifying the user of this access decision.
Length of code (y). As we will discuss below, the accumulator function is a one-
way function and its output can be viewed as a random sequence of bits. As a result,
the adversary succeeds if he can guess all the characters in this code. If we have 64
possible characters (including alphanumeric characters and symbols), the probability
of guessing a single character is 2 6. If we set the length of y to 5, the probability of
guessing the code y is roughly equal to 2 30.
In addition, as presented above, the calculation of y includes a random number
R. As a result, the adversary gains no advantage by learning any previous runs of
the protocol and the value of y as it is a one-way function of a number of variables
including a random variable.
5.2.4 Creating Deceit and Covert Communication
The introduction of covert channels in our scheme gives the user and app the
ability to convey a number of pre-determined messages without the knowledge of any
party positioning itself at any place in the communication channels. This can be done
by appending a number of bits to the input of the accumulation function in step (6).
To give an example, assume the protocol is designed to signal two di↵erent messages
to the server: (i) msg1 the user is accessing from a new wireless network, (ii) msg2 the
user selected read only access. When the app computes y in step (6) it can append two
bits to the hash output as the following; y = A(A(R), h(passwd||salt)||msg1||msg2)
where msg1 and msg2 are single bits that are set to 1 if the user want to signal this
message and 0 if the message is not being signaled.
The multitude of applications that can utilize such a mechanism is large and
it incorporates status communication as part of the authentication protocol. For
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example, the bank can take extra precautions if the user is authenticating from a
new networking environment. As another example, the user can signal duress if he
has been threatened and forced to transfer money to other accounts. Duress can
be signaled covertly, for example, by measuring rapid changes in the phone’s built-
in accelerometer where the user can subtly shake his phone during login. Another
example to signal duress is when the user presses the physical volume buttons during
the authentication process.
5.3 Enhancements
Full-Transaction Authentication After the user logs in, the same steps can be
repeated for every sensitive transaction with two main di↵erences: (i) instead of
sending the username, it is the transaction information that is sent, so that the QR
code will contain additional information about the transaction details along with the
HMAC and the user can verify those details on the app itself and make sure it is what
they really want; and (ii) the covert message part can be eliminated, only keeping
the part related to the failure of MAC checks. This part can be used, as we discussed
before, to lure attackers who are launching MitB attacks manipulating transactions
“on-the-fly.”
Phone Connectivity If the smartphone happens to have (optional) network con-
nectivity (step (a) in figure 5.2), it can spare the user the trouble of manually entering
the code displayed on its screen, and send it itself to the bank’s server (user sessions
can be uniquely identified by the server using the nonce R).
Storage of Insensitive Information The security of our scheme does not require
the long term storage of any information in the phone itself. Nevertheless, we can
benefit from storing information that can increase the utility of the covert communi-
cation. As an example, the app can store the name(s) of user’s home network(s) and
automatically send a covert message when the user is using a non-trusted network to
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login. Such knowledge gives service providers the ability to deploy risk-based authen-
tication. For example, when the user is using an untrusted network to login, limited
control can be provided and an extra level of authentication can be enforced when
significant transactions are required.
5.4 Security Analysis
Within our scheme when the bank sends A(R), the only party that can successfully
respond with y is one who knows the password and gets the smartphone to compute
h = H(password||salt) and thus the code y that is conveyed back to the server. This is
true because an adversary who gets A(h) and A(R) is unable to compute y = A(h,R)
without knowing either R or h, neither of which is available to the attacker. Also
note that, if the credentials database at the bank is leaked, no one can impersonate
the user without cracking the passwords, as in traditional password schemes. One
minor advantage this scheme provides is that cracking is slower for the adversary
because of the introduction of the accumulation function A – it is significantly slower
to accumulate every password in the cracking dictionary than to simply hash it.
Central to the security of our scheme is the fact that the only information of use
to an adversary (the password) is entered on the cell phone and not on the client
computer being used to remotely access the bank. The cell phone has no permanent
record of any sensitive information. In addition, the bank’s server never contains
(even ephemerally) the user’s password in the clear, providing a measure of defense
against a snooping insider at the bank.
Finally, we point out that there are a number of additional security advantages of
entering the user’s password in a smartphone application instead of the browser:
• The use of Software Guards. Traditional password based-schemes ask the user
to enter her password in the browser running on the client operating system.
Current browsers are not self-protected, as identified in [26], and they are a
complex pieces of software that are exposed to many vulnerabilities. For that,
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our scheme uses a specific phone application that can have intrinsic software
protection against tampering as illustrated in [26,54].
• Automated Trust Decision. Adversaries using social-engineering attacks to lure
users to give up their credentials, such as in the case of phishing, exploit the
users’ decision-making process by presenting them with legitimate-looking web
pages. Our scheme aids users in making trust decision about the authenticity of
a web page mandating that the website provides a cryptographic proof of their
knowledge of a shared secret; namely the password. This process is done in
total transparency to the user and the user is only asked to capture the picture
of a QR code.
This cryptographic proof can be computed by the web server without the need
of explicitly storing the password value and, more importantly, without storing
any information on the user’s phone. This significantly increases the di culty of
social engineering attacks, such as phishing, as it reverses the game – demanding
that the web site provides proof of authenticity before the user logs in.
• Smaller Chance for Shoulder-Surfing. Traditionally, users enter their passwords
using a large keyboard where shoulder surfing is an easy task for adversaries.
Asking the users to input their passwords on their phone increases the di culty
of such activity.
It worth noting that if the user logs-in to the service provider using a phone
browser, our scheme cannot be directly used to scan the QR code as we discussed
above. However, the basic protocol and feature can still be applicable with only
a change in how the QR is input. This can be achieved by developing a browser
extension that can automatically detect a QR code in the webpage and button on the
corner of such codes to be clicked by users to launch the authentication app where
the QR is automatically read. Nevertheless, the advantages of separating the service
login, previously done on the computer, and the authentication process on the phone
are slightly degraded. If the phone browser is infected with a MitB trojan, it would be
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easier to circumvent the security on the scheme as it can communicate directly with
the authentication app. However, we note that most security sensitive transactions on
a phone are done using dedicated apps that are hardened for a specific application. In
addition, the underlying principle of using a covert channel presented in this chapter
can be incorporated in these dedicated apps.
5.5 Comparison with Other Schemes
In table 5.1 we evaluate the di↵erent schemes using the following criteria.
Requirement of phone enrollment. Schemes such as CrontoSign and QRP [118]
require the user to register her phone with the bank, i.e. phone enrollment. Such
schemes store phone information, such as the IMEI number, and use it as part of their
protocol to achieve assurances about the user’s identity. One of the major issues of
tying the user’s identity to his phone is that the user may lose his phone, forget it or
run out of battery power. In these circumstances, the user wants to be able to use an
alternative phone to login to his account. If the user loses his phone he is vulnerable
to the threat of impersonation until he reports the incident to every bank he banks
with. In the case where he does not have his phone the usability of such a scheme
becomes an issue as the user cannot login to his account anymore. This could result
in lost business if the user moves to other banks that are supporting more usable
schemes.
Our approach addresses these concerns in two ways. First, we allow customers to
use many phones without degrading the security of the scheme or asking the user to
register all his phones. Second, we challenge the all-or-nothing assumption allowing
users to fall back to other authentication mechanisms dynamically, possibly setting
the privileges to only allow non-sensitive transactions.
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Requirement of long-term secrets. Many of the previously proposed schemes
require the storage of long-term secret(s) either on the users’ phones or on another
piece of specialized hardware [93, 118, 145]. Our scheme is the first scheme that pro-
vides full transaction authentication and user authentication that resist MitB without
the need to store long-term secrets or require additional hardware.
Resisting MitB. A recent paradigm in banking Trojans is to bypass two factor
authentication by launching MitB attacks that change transaction information on-
the-fly. We compare the schemes in table 5.1 based on their resistance to MitB.
When our scheme is used to authenticate transactions, as discussed in section 5.3, a
MitB attack can be defeated. This is because the MitB needs to send the modified
transaction information to the bank, where an HMAC is created. However, when the
user verifies this information on his phone after scanning the QR-code he can see that
the transaction details have been changed. He can click on a button to say that the
details have been changed and a deceptive code can be generated. The MitB attacker
would end up in phase (10) where they will be deceived.






















Our Scheme X X X X X X
CrontoSign [50] – – X X X –
QR-Tan [145] – – X X X –
hPin/hTan [93] N/A – X – N/A –
QRP [118] – – X X X –
Use of special hardware. Many proposals introduce a new piece of hardware to
the authentication scheme to achieve a higher level of assurance and to verify bank-
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ing transactions, such as the CAP scheme [49]. There are two major disadvantages
with those approaches: cost and usability. As an illustrative example, Barclay’s Bank
in the UK equipped users with special full-transaction authentication hardware, but
ended up having to reduce the functionality to only partial transaction authentication
because of many customer complaints. This degradation led to a number of security
vulnerabilities [2].
Requiring phone connectivity. A number of schemes are intended to maximize
their usability by making the smartphone or the special hardware act on the users’
behalf. In all the mechanisms we examined this comes with the cost of either requir-
ing the phone to have network connectivity, which is not always possible, or requiring
a direct communication between the users’ computers and their smartphones, which
hinders usability. In our scheme we share the same goals and enhance the usability
of our scheme by giving users the ability to login even though they do not have any
connectivity in their phone and without having to connect their phones to their com-
puters.
Compatible with existing infrastructure. Banks perceive security as an eco-
nomic and risk reduction activity. Protocols that require radical changes to current
infrastructure usually do not get adopted because of the associated high cost. In
addition, the ability to dynamically fall back to traditional authentication methods is
a preferred property giving banks the ability to dynamically deploy their new scheme




In this chapter, we have shown how deception can be used to enhance the se-
curity of passwords and authentication protocols. We presented an authentication
mechanism that has many attractive features, including compatibility with deployed
authentication infrastructure; flexible use of smartphones without requiring phone
registration or storage of permanent information in the phone; without any require-
ment of phone connectivity (i.e., using the phone as a computational device rather
than as a storage or communication device); resistance to many common forms of
attack; and a facility for user-friendly (pull-down menu on the cell phone app) covert
communication from the user to the bank. The covert communication in turn makes
possible di↵erent levels of access (instead of the traditional all-or-nothing), and the
use of deception (honeyaccounts) that makes it possible to dismantle a large-scale at-
tack infrastructure before it succeeds (rather than after the painful and slow forensics
that follow a successful phishing attack).
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6 DECEPTIVE PASSWORDS — ERSATZPASSWORDS
Passwords are the most dominant form of online authentication and likely to remain
so for a while despite their weaknesses. It thus behooves us to protect them as much
as possible. Within authentication servers, passwords are usually stored in a salted
hashed format to prevent easy pre-image recovery. Nevertheless, an adversary who
steals the list of hashed passwords can use brute-force techniques to find a password
p with a hash value H(p) that equals the value stored for a given user. Later, the
adversary can use p to impersonate the user at the authentication server.
There are a number of threats that come with the use of passwords. These threats
fall into three main categories: technical, procedural, and human related – these will
be discussed in more detail in the following section. There have been a number of
high-profile thefts of user passwords files in recent years. For example, Evernote
reported the leakage of the hashed passwords for more than 50 million users [67].
Other attacks against Yahoo, RockYou, LinkedIn, and eHarmony has been reported
[63] [167]. Furthermore, password cracking is often a precursor to more significant
attacks as illustrated in [116].
In this section we show how deception can be used to protect stored passwords.
We present a scheme that eliminates the possibility of any o✏ine password cracking
without physical access to the target’s machine. We designed the scheme such that
passwords’ hashes file will appear no di↵erent than a traditional file. However, we
incorporate “fake” passwords such that when an attacker uses traditional cracking
tools to recover users’ passwords he will “discover” these fake passwords. When such
passwords are used to login to the targeted systems, they will trigger an alarm. We




There have been many high profile incidents involving the leaking of hashed pass-
words files [47]. Users are still using poor passwords, even with the existence of pass-
word policies that try to guide users towards choosing more secure passwords. This
can be seen in the analysis of more than 70 million users’ passwords [17]. Bonneau
et al. presented an extensive comparative analysis of many authentication schemes
replacing passwords [18]. However, passwords will remain in use because of their
convenience, ease of use, and ease of deployment.
6.1.2 Password-Related Threats
The convenient and versatile use of passwords comes with its own challenges. We
define password-related threats as the attacks adversaries can launch to retrieve one
or more valid passwords of current legitimate users of the systems. These host-based1
threats can be grouped into three main categories.
Technical Threats
There are two sub-categories of technical threats associated with the use of pass-
words: server-side and client-side. Any piece of malware or key logger that can be
installed at the user’s machine to exfiltrate the user’s password is a threat to any
password-based authentication system. At the server side, adversaries can obtain
the file of stored password information and then impersonate the system user using
the stolen passwords. Strong host security is needed to protect the client and server
systems, but there are multiple opportunities for an attacker to capture a copy of the
stored password information.
1We are ignoring network snooping and other such remote mechanisms as our attention is directed
only at securing host-based password databases.
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A computer system needs to save an “authenticator” for every user during user
enrollment that is used to verify the identity claim during the login phase. Current
computer systems store a salted cryptographic hash (H) of the password along with
the username. In a system with n users, we have the following pairs:
(u1, H(p1)), (u2, H(p2)), ... , (un, H(pn))
where ui is the username of user i and pi is the password of user i.2 An attacker
who steals this list can launch an o✏ine attack to recover the hashed passwords using
some dictionary and replicating the hashing algorithm used. Many tools already exist
to automate an attack, such as John the Ripper3. There have been many attempts
to address this challenge, usually falling into one of three major approaches: (i)
significantly increasing the resources needed to match a password, (ii) strengthening
user passwords to make their recovery process unlikely as they will be unlikely to
be found in a dictionary, and (iii) instrumenting passwords files with fake decoy
passwords triggering an alarm when used indicating that the password file has been
attacked.
The development of password hashing algorithms from crypt to bcrypt, scrypt,
and others is mainly driven by the goal of increasing the resources needed to crack
the users’ passwords [115]. The introduction of private salts [86] was also intended
to increase the work required for cracking the password files. In addition, increasing
the number of rounds these algorithms apply to a password is a parallel approach to
increasing the work factor.
Cappos and Torres proposed “PolyPasswordHasher” [23] as a scheme to protect
passwords from o✏ine dictionary attacks. Their scheme additionally protects pass-
words with a secret share obtained using the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [138]. The
secret is saved in memory and used to verify passwords. One of the limitations of
their scheme is that it requires additional fields in the password file specifying which
2Salts, as an additional item in many systems, are described later.
3http://www.openwall.com/john/
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share to use. Also, if an attacker obtains access to the system memory he can steal
the secret.
Deception has been used to address the threats associated with cracking password
files. One approach is to inject fake accounts with passwords into the password file.
Another approach is to place decoy password files in the system luring the attackers
to access them believing they are the real files. Schemes such as Honeywords [84] are
intended to confuse the attacker by presenting him with many passwords associated
with a single username, where all of them are fake except one.
Procedural Threats
Password-recovery procedures associated with password-based authentication sys-
tems are sometime exploited to override current user passwords [136].
User-Centric Threats
Threats such as phishing, shoulder-surfing, password re-use, and others can be
used to undermine the security of password-based authentication systems. Our ap-
proach does not address these issues.
6.1.3 Injecting Deceit
In chapter 4 we discussed some of the unique advantages deception-based mecha-
nisms. We use deception in the previous chapter to enhance passwords’ at the clients’
side and in transit. In this chapter we discuss how deception is used to enhance the
security of passwords at the server side.
Rivest and Jules proposed augmenting the password database in Unix with nega-
tive information such that cracked password files can be detected [84]. Their proposal
is similar to Rao’s proposal of using “Failwords” [122]. Bojinov et al. proposed Kam-
ouflage, a scheme that is intended to protect the list of passwords used by a user
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and saved locally by a password manager [16]. Their scheme hides the real list with
a set of “fake” lists. Kontaxis et al. proposed an authentication scheme (SAuth)
that requires each user’s login attempt to be vouched for by another service provider,
so an attacker cannot impersonate a user by simply obtaining the password for one
web site [87]. They use deception in their scheme as a way to address the common
behavior of password reuse across multiple service providers.
Unlike previous proposals, our mechanism has the following advantages: (i) elim-
inating the requirement of any additional server/components, (ii) never presenting
the real user credentials to the attackers, and (iii) making password cracking impos-
sible without physical access to the targeted machine. The scheme runs internally
in the server without requiring any changes to the user interfaces, clients, and/or
experiences. A more detailed discussion of related literature is presented in the next
section.
One additional contribution our scheme provides is that it imposes risks to any
adversary who obtains a file of leaked usernames and passwords, causing mistrust
within the market for such files, and rendering their use risky for many parties. This
is because the unique property of our scheme of having the username and password
file look identical to the file generated by the traditional authentication scheme. This
property benefits not only the early adopters of the scheme, but the overall security
of other (non-adopting) systems. This is one of the distinguishing features of using




A number of cryptographic functions have been used in computer systems to
protect passwords, including crypt, bcrypt, and scrypt. As discussed earlier, part
of the motivation to develop additional algorithms is to make the cracking process
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of stolen password hashes files a resource-intensive process. Our scheme works with
any of these underlying functions; we will denote the function used as H. In later
discussion we will use bcrypt to give a concrete example, but without any loss of
generality.
Throughout this section we will assume the following format of the stored password
file. For each user (i) in the system we have the following triplet, at a minimum,
(ui, si, ↵i) saved in the password file:
• Username (ui).
• Multibyte (multi character) public salt (si).
• The hash of the user’s password pi as ↵i = H(piksi).
In addition, we will use a hardware-specific function denoted as HDF. This can
be implemented as a physically unclonable function (PUF) [147], a hardware security
module (HSM) [59] with a unique key, or any other mechanism of equivalent general
functionality.
Our goal is to enhance the security of the storage of passwords in three ways:
(i) require the process of computing the hash of the password to require access to a
hardware dependent function, thereby thwarting o✏ine cracking of stolen password
files, (ii) when an adversary attempts to crack the password file he will be presented
with a fake password that can trigger an alarm at the server when used, and (iii)
maintain the same appearance and format of the password file while implementing
the new scheme. The final property is essential to the success of the deceptive process
of injecting “fake” passwords. Unlike the Honeyword scheme, which mixes real pass-
words with fake ones, our scheme eliminates the ability of an adversary to obtain the
real password (without physical access to the targeted machine during the cracking
process) and seamlessly presents a fake password during an o✏ine cracking process.
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6.2.2 One-time Initialization
The initialization steps in our scheme are performed in two stages: system-side
initialization and user-specific initialization. The former makes all the users’ saved,
hashed, passwords machine-dependent – applying the hardware-dependent function
as follows. The hardware-dependent function HDF is applied to each stored password
hash ↵i and is then fed to the same hashing function, H, with the original salt, si.
After that, the output is stored in the password file replacing the old stored value.
This system-wide initialization will have each user password stored in the file as the
following
 i = H(HDF(↵i)ksi)
If an adversary obtains this file and tries to crack any user passwords, the prob-
ability that he will get any apparent match is negligible, even if a user password is
from a standard dictionary. The cracking software will be searching its dictionary
for a password equal to pi0 = HDF(↵i) and when hashed will give  i. An adversary
with knowledge of the scheme cannot distinguish between a password file that was
computed using our scheme or using the traditional scheme. Even under a stronger
assumption, where the adversary knows that the file has been computed using the
new scheme, the attacker gains no advantage as he cannot crack the user passwords
without access to hardware used to compute the function HDF. In the case where
the attacker is an insider, any extensive use of the HDF can be easily noticed with a
clear spike in API usage.
To incorporate the additional deceptive alarm component into our scheme —
returning an “ersatzpassword” when the adversary attempts cracking the password
file — we need to involve each user in a seamless fashion during any normal user
authentication. This process requires the user to enter her password, which is a
natural step during any authentication (because the password is not actually stored
or recoverable), and can be done during the first login process after the system wide
initialization.
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When the user attempts the first login after the initialization of our system, the
password is checked using the original hash function to see if it matches. If so,
the scheme will recompute the stored password value  i as follows. The hardware-
dependent function will be applied to the actual password pi and then an ersatz-
password (p⇤) will be chosen – we will discuss the use, choice, and characteristics
of ersatzpassword later in this chapter. A new user-specific salt is then selected,
to be used when computing the function H, to satisfy the following property; [
si0 = HDF(pi)   p⇤ ]. The scheme will take the first 128-bits of the result, as-
suming we are using a function H such as bcrypt that uses 128-bits salts, as the new
salt overwriting the existing salt si.
We note that the ersatzpassword password length can be, at maximum, as long
as the salt. In the current implementation of the bcrypt function, widely adopted to
implement the hash function H, the salt is 128-bits long. This gives us an ersatz-
password of up to 16 characters. This does not impact the plausibility feature of the
ersatzpassword, which will be discussed below. In the largest user passwords study
analyzing more than 70 million real user passwords, Bonneau reports that users tend
to use passwords with 6-8 characters [17]. If the ersatzpassword is shorter than the
salt, the above computation will result in having the salt include some of the output
of the HDF function. This does not a↵ect the security of the system as such output
does not leak any useful information about the real password even to someone who
has knowledge of the scheme and the length of the ersatzpassword p⇤.
To compute the stored value   our scheme calculates the following;
 i = H[ (HDF(pi)  si0) k si0 ]
If the output of the HDF is longer than the salt, we address this as follows. We
divide this output into chucks of length equal to the salt length. After that, we XOR
these chunks together and then XOR the result with the salt si0. Finally, this becomes
the input to the hash function H along with the concatenated salt.
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The stored value in the password file will be in the same format used in traditional
schemes. When an adversary tries to crack the password file, he will try to find a
password pi0 that when hashed usingH will give  i. In our scheme, we compute beta in
a format equivalent to the traditional password storage where the password is p⇤, i.e.
  = H(p⇤ k si0). As a result, an attacker who is launching a dictionary attack against
a stolen password file will likely find a result identifying p⇤ as the user password,
which is the ersatzpassword injected in the system. When the adversary uses this
password to login, an internal alarm will be triggered alerting the administrator that
someone exfiltrated and attempted to crack the user password file.
6.2.3 Login
There are three main cases of login in our scheme: successful login, when the user
enters the correct user/password pair; malicious login, when the adversary uses an
ersatzpassword; and error login, when the username/password pair does not match
anything. In this section we discuss how to evaluate the login request, in the presented
order, and determine a login decision.
When the user i wants to login she presents the username and password p¯ to the
authentication server. The system identifies the username record and obtains the
stored value  i and the salt si associated with it. The scheme computes
 i
0 = H[ (HDF(p¯)  si) k si ]
and checks whether  i
0 equals  i, and if so the user is successfully authenticated.
If the authentication fails, the scheme checks whether the password presented is
the ersatzpassword. This is done by computing
 i
00 = H[ p¯ k si ]
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and checking whether this equals  i. If they are equal, this indicates that someone is
trying to impersonate the user after cracking the password file and an internal alarm
is triggered.
If the two values are not equal, this can be treated as an erroneous login. The
system’s policy for erroneous login can then be applied.
6.2.4 Password Administration
Password Change
The user’s password change requests can be treated exactly as a new password.
The only di↵erence from traditional password schemes is that our approach mandates
the generation of a new salt that satisfies the property discussed above, the XOR
operation between the salt and the output of applying HDF on the password gives
an ersatzpassword.
Backup
One of the major factors that hinders the use of hardware-dependent functions is
the fact that the system catastrophically fails in the rare case where the hardware
associated with the HDF fails or is no longer available. Thus, we outline a secure
backup feature that can be used to recover the system in such a failure scenario.
This process utilizes public-key encryption and is initialized by generating a suitably
strong public/private key pair. The private key is never used in normal operation
and can be stored in a secure vault o✏ine. It is only needed in the recovery process.
The public key is used during the system wide initialization process and during the
process of password change.
When the system is initialized to adopt the new authentication scheme, all the
current username, password hash, and salt triplets (ui, ↵i, si) are encrypted using
the public key and stored as a backup. In addition, whenever a user changes her
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password, the new value ↵i0 (the new hash value resulting from the new password
using the traditional hash) is computed and the new triple overwrites or is appended
to the backup log, along with the ui and si values. As a result, the backup file with
have the following list (ui, si,↵i), for every user i in the system, encrypted under the
public key.
If a recovery is needed after failure, the private key is fetched and used to recover
the log file, which is then used to restore a traditional version of the password file.
That file can be instantiated on new hardware, with a new HDF, and users can be
forced to reset their passwords — leading to transition to our new scheme as they do
so.
It worth noting that decrypting the backup file using a brute-force attack should
not be practical. Even if the adversary, hypothetically, manages to recover the in-
formation in the backup file the resultant password security is at least as strong as
the currently deployed schemes. The cost in storage and computation to build the
recovery log is minimal.
Previous Passwords Storage
It is common for many authentication server to store previously used users’ pass-
words to prevent users from recycling them [46]. This can put users at risk when such
files are compromised. Although users are not using these passwords to login, they
can be used to impersonate users at other websites. If systems need to store these
passwords nevertheless, our scheme provides an additional advantage over traditional
methods of securely storing these passwords.
As our scheme saves the user passwords in a machine-dependent format, using
the function HDF, we can have some assurance that this password cannot be cracked
o✏ine without physical access to the target machine. Later, when attempting to store




We finally point out that in addition to the backup mechanism discussed above to
recover the system in the rare case of HDF function failure, our scheme comes with
an intrinsic fail-safe procedure. In this case, we can use the traditional authentication
method to check the passwords, comparing H(pi | si) with the stored value  i, where
the e↵ective user password becomes the ersatzpasswords.
6.3 ErsatzPasswords – The Use of Deception
The scheme presented in this chapter provides the guarantee that stored users
passwords cannot be cracked without physical access to the hardware-dependent func-
tion (HDF). With the increased complexity of computer systems and targeted attacks
computer systems are still vulnerable to security compromise and the list of stored
passwords can be stolen. In addition, the latest Verizon Data Breach Investigation
Report (DBIR) shows that about 50% of attacks thwarting authentication mecha-
nisms take months or longer to be discovered. Even worse, 88% of these attacks are
discovered by external parties. Integrating deceptive passwords in the design of our
scheme addresses these two issues.
When attackers obtain the stolen credentials and apply the cracking process, we
can design our scheme to negatively respond to this activity as in [41]. This allows
an attacker, who obtains this file, to notice such behavior and simply look for other
vulnerabilities to exploit. Instead, the scheme is designed to present an attacker with
plausible deceptive passwords leading him to believe that he successfully cracked the
password file. When a login is attempted using the deceptive passwords, system
defenders will be immediately alerted to two facts: (i) that the login credentials
database was leaked; and (ii) that an attacker is currently trying to impersonate the
system’s users to gain access. This design enables system defenders to use internal
controls for detecting credentials’ database leakages, and for alerting them of an
ongoing attack before it succeeds.
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6.3.1 ErsatzPasswords Generation
The process of generating an ersatzpassword for each user account can be for-
malized as follows. Let Gen(pi) be the function that takes the user’s password and
outputs the selected ersatzpassword. This function should provide two essential prop-
erties: plausibility and non-deducibility. The former ensures that an ersatzpassword
generated by Gen() is plausible to an adversary as a real user password. The latter
provides the guarantee that even when an adversary knows the scheme, he cannot
deduce any information from the ersatzpassword about the real user password. We
define these two properties more formally later in the chapter. We want this function
to be randomized and to give us an ersatzpassword every time we use it. Of course,
the generated ersatzpassword should have the properties discussed later in this chap-
ter. We present below several constructions of how to realize this function and discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of each construction.
Total Password Replacement
When Gen() receives the user’s password it can generate the ersatzpassword using
the following procedure. For every character in the user password, replace it with a
randomly chosen character from the same category (alphabetical with alphabetical,
a digit with a digit, and a special character with a special character). After this
replacement process, a cyclic shift is applied to the password by a random number of
positions to generate the ersatzpassword.
We note that this process reveals two properties of the real password to an ad-
versary when he views the ersatzpassword: the password’s length and its character
composition. In this case adversaries can use probabilistic context-free replacement
to significantly narrow down the space of possible user passwords using knowledge of
the ersatzpassword [168]. One of the potential ways to overcome this is to randomly
truncate or append some random characters to generate the ersatzpassword.
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List-Based
One of the most straightforward ways of generating the ersatzpassword using
Gen() is to randomly choose a word from an internal dictionary of candidates. This
realization ofGen() has two major limitations: the generation of ersatzpassword is not
influenced by user-specific information and the existence of such a list in the system
can a↵ect the stealthiness of the deceptive component (the existence of the list is a
sign that such a scheme is currently being used by the system). The former limitation
is not as significant because the attacker never sees the “real” users’ passwords. The
advantage of using such method is the ability to have a high degree of plausibility
of the ersatzpasswords. We can compile a list of the some of the previously leaked
passwords used by real users and use them as our ersatzpasswords.
Grammar-Based Methods
Bojinov et al. propose a new method of generating plausible user passwords
in [16] extending the work of Ross et al. in [126] and Weir in [168]. Their method is
similar to our total password replacement method, however they tokenize the password
representing distinct syntactic elements. For example, the password “wtyy234ou*”
has the following token sequence W1 = {wtyy} |D2 = {234} |W3 = {ou} |S4 = {⇤} | .
When generating the ersatzpassword, each token will be replaced with another token,
of the same length, from a dictionary.
The main drawback of this method is that it leaks the type, number, and length
of tokens of the original password. We address this concern by enhancing their im-
plementation of Gen() as follows. After tokenizing the password, we perform the
following:
• We can randomly append or delete k tokens. For example, let say we add token
S5 to the above password.
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• After that, we can randomly shu✏e the order of these tokens. In the above
example, the shu✏e can give us the following order W3 | S5 |D2 | S4 |W1.
• Finally, we randomly choose a word from a dictionary that matches each token.
The chosen token can have length that is di↵erent from the original token. In
our example, let’s say that W3 = “abc”, S5 = “!”, D2 = “10”, S4 = “ + ” and
W1 = “test”.
Using the grammar-based method with our modification can generate the following
ersatzpassword “abc!10+test.”
Using User Input
Our discussion so far assumes that the scheme can work without any interaction
with the users. However, we note that ersatzpassword can be constructed with im-
plicit or explicit user input. Many authentication servers save previously used user
passwords in the system preventing users from recycling their old password when their
current password expires. This implicit user input, previously chosen user passwords,
can be used as the ersatzpassword for this user account. With explicit user input, the
system can prompt the user to enter another password during registration and use
this as the ersatzpassword password.
The main advantage of using implicit user input is ensuring a high degree of
plausibly, discussed later, of the ersatzpassword as this has been previously used as a
real password. However, this method su↵ers from two major disadvantages. First, if
an adversary cracks the password file and recovers the ersatzpassword, this might put
the user in danger as users are known to reuse passwords across multiple sites [44].
Second, this has the potential of signaling a false alarm in the case where the user
forgets and uses his previous password to login.
Explicit user input requires some changes to the user interfaces. More importantly,
users are likely to pay less attention, choosing very guessable passwords and/or con-
fusing the ersatzpasswords with their real ones leading to the problem of false alarms.
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In addition, users may provide an additional, ersatzpassword that is closely related to
their real password, e.g. by appending a number or a character to their real password
to create the ersatzpassword.
A combination of several of these methods may be the best approach.
6.3.2 ErsatzPasswords Properties
Incorporating deception in this scheme actively feeds an adversary cracking a
stolen password file with some ersatzpasswords chosen to trigger internal alarms when
used. These passwords should have the following properties to ensure their e↵ective-
ness.
Plausibility
When an adversary is cracking a password file, these words will present themselves
as a successful outcome, i.e. when hashed along with the salt they will match the
stored hashed user password in the traditional way. For the e↵ectiveness of the
scheme, these need to be plausible user passwords. Plausibility in critical in this
case because these passwords must appear as they have been chosen by users as
their login credentials. Thus, some dictionary and generation algorithms should be
present to produce plausible ersatzpasswords (so their generation is random subject
to plausibility rather than in absolute terms).
We can define a plausible generator function Gen() more formally by using the
following game:
• The adversary views many runs of the function p⇤ = Gen(p) along with their
associated usernames, where p⇤ is the ersatzpassword. The adversary can choose
the values of u and/or p.
• The adversary sends a username to Gen().
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• Gen() selects a password p, either from the real user, existing user or public
password files, and computes the ersatzpassword p⇤ = Gen(p). Then Gen()
sends both p and p⇤ back without distinguishing them.
• The adversary outputs (1) if she thinks p⇤ is the ersatzpassword and (0) other-
wise. The adversary wins if she distinguishes the ersatzpassword from the real
password with probability Pr.
We say that Gen() is a plausible function if the probability for adversarial success
is one-half — an adversary cannot do better than random guessing which of the
two passwords is the ersatzpassword. That is, Pr = 1/2 + ✏ where ✏ is increasingly
negligible as the number of trials increases.
Typo-Resilience
When the user is typing her real password, she may make a mistake by mistyping
some characters. The ersatzpassword associated with the account should have enough
edit distance from the actual password to ensure that an alarm is not triggered by
mistake. As the real user password is present when selecting which ersatzpassword
to use, the server can easily compute an edit distance to ensure that the user does
not mistype the ersatzpassword during the login process.
Non-Deducibility
It is essential for the ersatzpassword to not reveal any useful information about
the real user password. Even though we do not actively give adversaries the ersatz-
passwords, we store them with the same level of protection used to store current real
users’ passwords. We define the function Gen() to provide non-deducibility using the
following game:
• The adversary views many runs of the function p⇤ = Gen(p) where she can
choose the values of u and/or p (p⇤ is the ersatzpassword).
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• The adversary chooses two passwords p1 and p2, and sends then to function
Gen().
• Gen() flips a coin and computes p⇤ = Gen(p1) if it gets heads or p⇤ = Gen(p2)
otherwise. p⇤ is then presented to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs (1) if she thinks p⇤ = Gen(p1) and (0) otherwise with
probability Pr.
We say that Gen() is a non-deducible function if the probability for adversary
success is half. — the adversary cannot do better than randomly guessing which
of the two passwords was used to generate p⇤. That is, Pr = 1/2 + ✏ where ✏ is
increasingly negligible as the number of trials increases.
Policy Adherence
It is essential that ersatzpasswords adhere to any system-wide policy of how users’
password should appear. For example, some restrictions can be imposed on the length,
format, and composition of user passwords. An adversary who sees any password
violating the system’s policy can detect that this cannot be a real password as the
system would not have accepted it. In addition, some websites mandate that user
password cannot be dictionary words. In these cases, using a password list as the
method to generate ersatzpassword can be challenging as it is not trivial to come up
with a long list satisfying each server’s policy. In addition, any change to the policy
would require recomputing the list. However, the use of grammar-based approaches,
similar to the one illustrated above, can be much simpler as grammar can become
part of the input of the generator function Gen().
Crackable
Part of the plausibility aspect of our scheme is deciding whether all ersatzpass-
words should be crackable or not. Generally, this should not be the case. Many cur-
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rent systems add more stringent requirements of password choice to high privileged
users. When they become easily crackable, this might increase adversary suspicion.
In addition, it would also look suspicious if all user passwords were crackable. It
might be wise to use some randomly-generated ersatzpasswords within a system to
enhance the scheme’s plausibility.
6.4 Implementation and Analysis
In this section, we describe the implementation details of the our system. A pre-
liminary evaluation is also presented followed by a discussion driven by the observed
results.
6.4.1 Implementation Details
We implemented the our scheme by modifying the authentication mechanism in an
FreeBSD operating system. The pam unix Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM),
which handles the user authentication process, is modified to incorporate our system.
The design decision is driven by the simplicity of PAM modules as well as the preser-
vation of expected behavior during user authentication. The e↵ectiveness of the
deception relies on the fact that the user authentication system appears no di↵erent
than standard FreeBSD user authentication.
The system relies on two key components: the hardware dependent function HDF
and the ersatzpassword generation function Gen(). We used the basic Yubico Yu-
biHSM [173], a USB hardware security module, as our HDF. Specifically, HDF is a
HMAC-SHA1 with a fixed secret key (k) internally stored inside the HSM;
HDF(p) := HMAC-SHA1k(p)
For the ersatzpassword generation, Gen(), we implemented the List-Based approach
described in section 6.3.1. This choice was mainly driven by the fact that we can pre-
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select ersatzpasswords and have more accurate measurements. The code can be easily
modified to choose any ersatzpassword generation algorithm. As a proof of concept,
we used a list of six-character dictionary words as our ersatzpasswords from [29]. A
password is selected from the dictionary of 15,788 and used as the ersatzpassword
during user account initialization.
6.4.2 Analysis
We analyze two authentication processes when comparing our implementation
of the new authentication scheme and the standard FreeBSD authentication. First,
we compare the latency for adding a new user into the system and the latency for
authenticating a valid user. Second, the storage of cryptographic hashes of the user’s
password must appear and behave as in a typical FreeBSD operating system. In
addition to maintaining the fidelity for accurate user authentication user password
hashes must also work with conventional password cracking tools such as John the
Ripper 4 to ensure the plausibility of the ersatzpasswords. We conducted our analysis
on a FreeBSD virtual machine with a single core clocked at 2.7 Ghz.
Password Update and Authentication Latency
To evaluate the performance of our authentication module, we compare the la-
tency with the standard pam unix module found in FreeBSD. Two measurements
are considered: the latency to update an existing password and the latency to au-
thenticate a user. The password is fixed to “password” for all experiments. Addi-
tionally, the authentication evaluation also considers the latency of using “ersatz”
for the ersatzpassword. The evaluation consists of running the pam chauthtok and
pam authenticate as found in passwd and login. Password update and authenti-




Figure 6.1.: Distribution of Password Update Latency in the Ersatzpassword Scheme
Figure 6.2.: Distribution of Password Update Latency in the Original pam unix
As shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2, the median latency time to update a user’s
password for our ersatz system is 287.3 ms while the latency on a standard FreeBSD
system is 8.8 ms. These results indicate that further optimization is needed to reduce
the latency for our module to match the expected behavior of the standard FreeBSD
pam unix module. However, this di↵erence is unlikely to be noticed by a user and it
is a one-time cost.
A similar pattern is observed when comparing authentication latency. Figures
6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 illustrate the latencies in system response observed when providing a
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Figure 6.3.: Comparison of Password Update Latency Between Ersatzpassword and
Original pam unix
valid password and an ersatzpassword in our system in comparison with the latency in
system response when providing a valid password in a conventional FreeBSD system.
Note that the latency di↵erence compared between our system and the conventional
system are similar to the password update latency. The median system latency for
authentication in our system is 277.76 ms when providing the correct password and
281.95 ms when providing the ersatzpassword, as depicted in figure 6.4. The system’s
latency for authenticating a valid user on a standard FreeBSD system is 5.14 ms.
Figure 6.4.: Comparison of Real and Decoy Password Authentication in the
Ersatzpassword Scheme
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We note that there are a number of reasons for the observed performance dif-
ference. The YubiHSM APIs are written in python and the implementation of our
scheme is written in C as a modified pam unix module. A call from C to Python has
an impact on the system performance. To validate our concern, we used pmcstat5
to profile our modified pam unix module. The results from pmcstat showed that the
largest bottleneck is found in the libpython2.7.so library. Specifically, the bottle-
neck is PyEval FrameEx which interprets and executes bytecodes from a given frame.
Another bottleneck is PyObject Malloc which is indirectly called when converting
a C string to a Python string. Such conversion is needed in our modified pam unix
module when initializing the YubiHSM and generating a salt or the hash.
Table 6.1: Number of Instructions for Creating a New User Under the new
pam unix Module
Step # of instructions Percentage
Initialize 77,737,691 68.47%
Generate Ersatz 6,816 0.006%
Create Salt 273,322 0.24%
Hash Password 28,551,342 25.5%
Close 5,325,039 4.75%
To investigate other potential bottlenecks, we used valgrind6 with the callgrind
toolset to compare the number of instructions executed in the ersatz pam unixmodule
and the standard freeBSD pam unix module. For each module, we looked at the
amount of time it takes to enroll a new user in the system. For the ersatz pam unix
module, this includes initializing and closing the YubiHSM module in addition to
generating an ersatzpassword, creating a salt value, and hashing. Table 6.1 contains
the number of instructions for each function needed to create a new user. Note that
initiating and closing the session with YubiHSM accounts for more than 70% of the
instructions. In comparison to the standard freeBSD pam unixmodule, creating a salt




Generating a salt in the ersatz pam unix module takes roughly 10 times longer than in
the standard freeBSD pam unix module. The total number of instructions to enroll
a new user in the ersatz pam unix module takes about 4.96 times more than the
standard freeBSD pam unix module.
Figure 6.5.: Distribution of User Authentication Latency in the Ersatzpassword
Scheme
We also investigated the I/O overhead for both modules with ktrace, which
enables kernel trace logging in freeBSD. In the ersatz pam unix module, about 280ms
are spent waiting for I/O, while in the pam unix module only 0.008ms is spent waiting
for I/O. These numbers indicate that the overhead to communicate with the YubiHSM
accounts for the largest bottleneck in our ersatz pam unix module.
The main reason for the performance deficiencies above is the fact that we are using
a basic HDF function, namely the YubiHSM, which is not optimized for performance.
A built-in device rather than a USB device should provide a speed improvement and
reduce the I/O overhead. We believe that a combination of optimizations might bring
the times close enough that it would not be obvious to an observer what might be in
use on the system. If that is not a consideration, the additional latency of the current,
unoptimized implementation would be clearly insignificant in normal operation.
It worth noting that the performance impact of using ersatzpasswords does not
have an impact on normal users’ experience. Despite the performance impact depicted
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Figure 6.6.: Distribution of Detecting the Use of an Ersazpassword to
Authentication
Figure 6.7.: Distribution of User Authentication Latency in the Original pam unix
in figures 6.3 and 6.8, the user gets a response whether her credentials are accepted
or not within a fraction of a second – this is hardly noticeable by a human user. In
fact, often operating systems impose an artificial delay when the first login attempt
fails using the pam faildelay module.
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Figure 6.8.: Comparison of Password Authentication Latency Between
Ersatzpassword and the Original pam unix
Crackable Ersatz Hashes
To demonstrate that the our scheme produces crackable hashes, we generated 1000
hashes with the real passwords of password1, password2, · · · , password1000 and
ersatzpasswords randomly selected from our list of six-character dictionary words. We
ran John the Ripper on all 1000 hashes created by our scheme to crack the generated
hashes. John the Ripper successfully cracked all 1000 hashes and retrieved all the
ersatzpasswords.
One interesting observation is that if two users select the same exact password
and if the ersatzpassword selected is less than the length of the salt, then some of the
bits in the salt are the same between both users. Such an anomaly would be unlikely
in a conventional master.passwd file and may raise suspicion of the deception. This
can be mitigated by properly generating ersatzpasswords to avoid such situations.
6.5 Chapter Summary
Passwords have been widely regarded as one of the weak points of securing any
digital system. They come with their inherent weaknesses in how they are chosen,
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stored, memorized, and managed. In this chapter, we presented a scheme that address
the wide-spread threat of stealing hashed password files and cracking them o✏ine to
impersonate user accounts to further infiltrate computer systems. Our scheme makes
it impossible for an adversary to recover user passwords from their hashed format
without physical access to the targeted machine. We show how we can instantaneously
protect any system with the involvement of its user. Furthermore, we discussed how
we can deceive an attacker who steals the hashed users’ password file by presenting
him with ersatzpasswords that work as “decoy” passwords that trigger an alarm when
used to access the system. We discussed how to generate these passwords and their
properties. Finally, we implemented our scheme discussing the design decisions and
the performance analysis. Our goal is with the deployment of our scheme, we can
end the possibility of cracking user passwords and, at the same time, detect any
exflitration and cracking attempt on users’ hashed password file.
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7 DECEPTIVER — A CENTRALIZED DECEPTIVE SERVER
Reconnaissance is a cornerstone step for any successful cyber attack [80]. Current
systems are designed to respond truthfully to all request coming to public facing
network services. If the requester is identified to be malicious, our systems are also
designed to respond truthfully by responding with an error message or dropping the
request. Thus, these systems are designed to aid computer attacker through their
reconnaissance step where they gather information about our systems and determine
all the information our systems know about them.
The latest Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) identified web ap-
plication attacks as the most common incident in 2013 accounting for 35% of all
incidents [159]. Moreover, more than 90% of those attacks are being discovered by
external parties, making the matter worse for breached organizations. The report
also shows that more than 60% of web application attacks take minutes or less to
compromise the target, while more than 40% of these attacks take months to be dis-
covered. In addition, Gartner states that more than 70% of threats are at the web
application layer [48].
In this chapter we present a deceptive system, referred to as Deceptiver, that
gives public facing servers the ability to respond with deceptive responses. Deceptiver
maintains a consistent deceptive story across all public-facing servers connected to
it. It works as a centralized deceptive server behind all these processes. Each public-
facing server, e.g. WWW servers and FTP servers, connect to the Deceptiver server
through a server-specific hook that augments their responses with deceit.
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7.1 Background
Most organizations use a number of internet-facing services to connect with their
customers and provide their services. By design, these services respond to all requests
unless the request’s identifier(s), e.g. IP address, are specifically blacklisted, in which
case usually the connection is silently dropped. However, internet-facing servers are
continuously being targeted as one of the entry points of compromise. Six of the
OWASP’s top 10 security risks are cause by the behavior of computer systems of
always responding faithfully to all requests [112].
Moreover, spiders scan websites collecting data that can be used as part of the
reconnaissance stage. Spammers harvest users’ emails and contact information to
target their inboxes with spam and/or fraud [119]. More advanced adversaries use this
information to craft a targeted attack such as spear phishing or socially engineering
their targets. Often this information is readily available from organizations’ public
web pages. Targeted attacks, such as spear phishing, are four times more likely to be
successful – according to [113] – and their success is a result of the public information
we make readily available in public pages.
Basic deception techniques have been used to address some of the challenges im-
posed by these risks. Honeybots have been used to monitor common attack vectors
and adding the origin of those attacks to a common blacklist database [119]. In ad-
dition, Anagnostakis et al. used “shadow honeypots” where they dynamically direct
suspected server’s tra c [9]. The shadow honeypot mimics the internal state of the
real production system. This loose coupling between the shadow honeypot and pro-
duction systems poses a number of challenges though. In the red-teaming experiment
by Heckman and her team, discussed in section 4.3, the red-team was able to detect
that they were interacting with the fake instance even with the use of the advanced
“Blackjack” tool. Another deceptive tool called Web Labyrinth was developed to
create a web structure to entrap and exhaust a web scanner [81].
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There are a number of limitations to the previous proposals. They are mainly
passive systems and only activated when the adversary touches some resources they
are not supposed to. This is mainly the case with the Web Labyrinth tool. In addition,
the loose coupling between fake and real systems and the challenge of presenting a
plausible version of the truth hinders the e↵ectiveness of using deception – as discussed
in the MITRE experiment discussed in section 4.3.
7.2 Overview
The main idea behind the Deceptiver is to apply deception at a higher logical view
of the protected systems. Traditional similar uses of deception, such as honeypots,
use deception by creating a fake image of production systems and trying to lure
adversaries to them. Such systems come at a high cost of maintenance in three ways.
First, to ensure the plausibility of these deceptive techniques, the fake image needs
to continuously reflect all the changes made in the real system. Second, fake systems
are yet another set of systems that need to be administered and updated. It is vital
that these systems are not used as an entry point to real systems because one might
pay less attention to their maintenance. Third, when injecting deceit the fake system
resources need to be individually changed.
Unlike the previous uses, Deceptiver applies deception to the resource either (i)
by responding with a new deceptive response which is created on-the-fly, or (ii) by
modifying systems resources on-the-fly before sending them to the adversary. In other
words, Deceptiver provides a deceptive “view” of the system resources in a consistent
manner. There is no need to create a duplicate of production systems to respond to
attackers with deceptive responses.
There are two categories of the deceptive responses created by Deceptiver. The
first category aids computer defenders whether the current requester is malicious or
not. In this category, deceit is injected in a way that does not change the resource.
Instead, deceit is injected to create “traps” that only users with malicious intent will
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fall for. We discuss these further in section 7.3.1. The second category of responses
assume that the request has been determined as malicious and deceit is injected to
lead attackers astray, confuse them, attribute them, and/or waste their time and
resources. The request is determined to be malicious in one of two ways: (i) the
computer system determines that the request is malicious, e.g. blacklists, firewall
etc., or (ii) an adversary has fallen for the Deceptiver traps.
7.3 Deceptiver Design
Deceptiver works as a server in a computer system providing centralized decisions
on how to augment internet-facing servers with deception. There are two main com-
ponents in the design: Deceptiver core and Deceptiver hooks. The core makes the
decision on how to respond to a particular request. It also provides a full history of
all the requests that are received by an Internet-facing server and whether deception
has been applied or not. The hooks translate the Deceptiver decision into application-
specific actions that can be realized by the servers. The overall design is depicted in
figure 7.1. The logical flow of requests goes through the following steps:
1. Requests arrive at a client server where the request meta-data, such as headers,
is parsed.
2. Deceptiver’s hooks intercept all the variables and passes them to the core where
a decision is made on how to respond. There are four general outcomes:
(a) Request is blocked and standard responses are returned.
(b) Request is blocked and deceptive responses are returned.
(c) Request is allowed to go through as usual.
(d) Request is allowed to go through. However, before the response is re-
turned, deceit is injected in the response.
As we discussed earlier, there are two general types of deceit that we can inject to
responses: creating traps to identify adversaries, or responding with fake information
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Figure 7.1.: Deceptiver’s Overall Design
to give a plausible fake view of the system. We discuss these in more details in the
next section.
7.3.1 Deceptive Responses
Every time a request arrives at a server the Deceptiver core needs to make a
decision whether to inject deceit into the response. As discussed earlier, deceit can
be used as a mechanism to identify adversaries or as a mechanism to confuse them or
lead them astray. The former case is usually non-intrusive and does not a↵ect normal
user interactions. Subtle deceitful data points are added to the response as traps to
detect adversaries. The latter category of responses is used to present a full or partial
fake view of the resource requested.
Most of the discussion will focus on the Deceptiver core and an example of one
of its hooks, namely the WWW server hook that we developed for Apache servers.
We might discuss some application specific example, but the general concept behind
them would still apply to any server.
It worth noting that the fake resources discussed in this chapter do not need to
physically exist in the production server. The Decetpiver Hooks can create those
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on-the-fly and add them or append them to the real system responses. In section,
7.4 we discuss some of the possible implementations and designs of how this can be
achieved.
Deceptiver Traps
At the reconnaissance phase, adversaries usually interact with targeted servers to
find vulnerabilities and gauge all the relevant information. This is usually achieved
with an iterative process where an adversary alters the request to the server and
observes the response. Typical systems guide adversaries throughout this response by
responding truthfully to all requests. Deceptiver traps embed enticing, yet plausible,
fake variables that have no real function at the server. When such variables are
altered, manually by an adversary or automatically by automated tools, security
administrators are pro-actively alerted of the existence of an attack at its early stages.
Instead of simply blocking the malicious users, the second type of response, namely
Active Responses, are injected to confuse attackers and/or lead them astray.
Traps can be categorized into the following categories:
• Administrative Resources — Servers use a number of administrative files
that are used by administrators to configure the behavior of server and/or the
set of rules applied to responses. Example of those files in WWW servers are
the .htaccess and the robot.txt files. Deceit can be injecting in these files by
adding some rules that only adversaries would fall for. As an example, in the






Figure 7.2.: An Example of a Deceptiver Trap in .htaccess
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When the page admin-access.html is not linked to from any other page normal
users should not normally reach this page. Only malicious users who are looking
for holes or vulnerabilities in the server will attempt to access this page. When
access is attempted, Deceptiver can flag the user and active deceptive responses
can be used to feed the user fake information or obtain more information from
them.
As another example, Deceptiver can intercept all requests to access files in
FTP servers. When a malicious user asks for the etc/passwd file, the server
can respond back with a fake list of users. When someone tries to connect to
accounts associated with these users or browse their files, we can flag this user
as malicious.
• Isolated Resources — Servers can inject a number of isolated resources that
should not be accessed by normal users during their normal operations. As an
example, in WWW servers these can be a number of web pages that are not
linked with any other pages. Normal users would not be able to reach those
web pages by following links on the website.
• Response Meta or Hidden Data — Server responses send meta data. De-
ceptiver can inject some enticing, yet useless meta-data to the server response
and monitor how the user interacts with them. Normal user interactions are
not a↵ected by such information. However, when such data is altered or used,
Deceptiver can flag such users.
For example, Deceptiver can append a number of URL variables that are entic-
ing to attackers, see figure 7.3. When the user attempts to change the variable
to debug=true, they can be flagged and an active deceptive response can be
returned. Hidden data can also be used as traps. Deceptiver can inject some
hidden form elements with some interesting names. When the user assigns some
data to those or alters the default data, they can also be flagged.
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1 https://www.example.com/payment.php?debug=false
Figure 7.3.: An Example of a Deceptiver Trap – Response Meta Data
Such data can persist over multiple sessions where they get stored at the client
machine. For example, cookies are stored at the users’ machine and should
always be submitted “as is.” We can include some enticing, yet unusable,
variables in those cookies, such as admin=false, or create new cookies. When
these are altered or partially submitted the user can be flagged.
• Known Vulnerabilities or Violation of Policies — Often an attack uses
a preexisting vulnerability to gain some access or additional useful information
to launch subsequent attacks. In addition, malicious users usually try to cross
security boundaries to gain access to sensitive information. Deceptiver can
be used to design traps using known vulnerabilities, applying deception, when
those boundaries are crossed.
For example, Deceptiver can take advantage of a vulnerability such as Heart-
bleed [52] to its advantage. A group of researchers at University of Texas at
Dallas created decoy software that fixes the Heartbleed vulnerability but at
the same time sent some fake responses as though the Heartbleed vulnerability
is still unfixed [69]. This functionality can be incorporated in the design of
Deceptiver.
As another example, in FTP servers we can set up a fake view of files when
an adversary attempts to access a file to which they do not have permission.




Most servers rely on a blacklist of known malicious users to deny attempts to
access their resources. However, it is becoming increasingly easier for adversaries
to change their attacks to evade such simple detection mechanisms. Deceptiver is
designed to utilize these blacklists, in addition to the use of its traps, discussed above,
and enhance the security of these servers by sending deceptive responses to those
adversaries to confuse them and/or lead them astray. Moreover, Deceptiver gives
security administrators the ability to use deception in the case where they are not
certain that the user is malicious or not.
Traditional security measures often treat most requests as benign unless they are
part of a firewall blacklist. Deceptiver distinguishes between three main categories of
users and treats them di↵erently, namely benign, suspected, and malicious. In general,
Deceptiver traps help security administrators to distinguish benign users from the
others. If users interact with a trap, they transition into the suspected category, see
figure 7.4. Then, Deceptiver sends them some active deceptive responses, as we will
discuss in this section, and when adversaries respond to that they transition into the
malicious category of users.
Figure 7.4.: Users Categories in Deceptiver
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In section 4.5.1, we discussed how deception can be applied to di↵erent parts of
a computer systems. The categories we illustrated in figure 4.2 also applies to how
can we apply deception to servers’ responses. Below we discuss how deception can be
applied to a number of these categories.
System Performance When Deceptiver detects a malicious interaction with con-
nected servers, it can apply deception to provide a fake view of servers’ performance.
One way to respond is to present adversaries a fake error message that the server is
down and currently under maintenance. This is an improvement over what current
firewalls do, where they either block the attack or drop the requests silently, in two
ways. An opportunistic adversary will pass over this server and go to the next server
in their list. The other advantage is that such a response will give security admin-
istrators more time to enhance their defenses and be proactive. Tailored honeypots
can be set up and live monitoring of the threat can be achieved. Traditional security
mechanisms would alert adversaries that their attack has been detected by our tools
and they need to be more stealthy and change their known blacklisted artifact next
time.
System Public Data One example of a malicious server request is data harvesting
bots that gather organizations’ public information as a precursor to their attack
campaign. Later, this data is used in a wider range of attacks including phishing,
spear phishing, scamming, and others. Often organizations blacklist these bots from
accessing all their public information, which simply requires them to change their
artifacts.
Deceptiver can apply deception to this public information by replacing organiza-
tion contact details on-the-fly by plausible fake ones. Furthermore, organizations can
monitor these emails to spot any advanced threats or targeted phishing attacks. In
addition, monitoring those accounts can help organizations recover from false posi-
tives if this is a priority.
130
System Software and Services As part of the reconnaissance stage, adversaries
gather as much information they can to tailor their attack to the targeted machines.
Often, servers respond with detailed information of the type and version of software
being used. Such behavior can be exploited be Deceptiver where we can mask the
identities of the software and services we are running. Crenshaw found this to be
useful to confuse attackers when obfuscating the identity of operating systems or-
ganizations’ servers are running [40]. Deceptiver can also pretend to be running a
number of fake services and monitor any requests that attempt to interact with them.
7.3.2 Centralized Deception
The main goal of the Deceptiver is to provide a centralized decision making for
the use of deception. It gives computer defenders a holistic centralized view of how
and when deception has been applied. It also gives an easy way to manage the use of
deception within computer systems. Unlike traditional uses of deception, such as the
use of honeypots, the design of Deceptiver gives security defenders a better control
over the deception being used with a server and across di↵erent servers.
It is worth noting that although the Deceptiver is designed to provide consistent
deception over many servers, it can be configured to confuse adversaries by showing
inconsistent deception. As discussed in section 4.6.3, inconsistency can be helpful
when our goal is to frustrate adversaries and confuse them. Also, inconsistent decep-
tion can be used as a tactic when an attacker suspects that deception is being used
to feed them false information.
7.4 Implementation and Deployment
Deceptiver is implemented in Python as a command line tool. It has two main
operation modes: administration and decision making. Security administrators can
use the administration part to set up and configure the deception server. When
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the system admin launches Deceptiver with the admin option they can choose an
administrative action list as depicted in figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5.: Admin Section of Deceptiver
Deceptiver uses an internal SQL database to store all the deceptive rules and all
the connection information that was parsed to determine the action. The database
interaction in the code has been implemented using an Object Relational Mapper
(ORM) library called peewee1.
Inputs and outputs to Deceptiver are standardized and are application indepen-
dent. Individual server hooks prepare the request to Deceptiver and translate the
response into application specific instruction. Deceptiver receives all its input as
command line arguments. An explanation of each one of these inputs is presented in
appendix A.1.
7.4.1 Apache Server Hook
We implemented a hook for Deceptiver with the Apache web server. We used
the mod security Apache module, which is used to enforce Apache’s web application
firewall (WAF), to hook a communication script with Deceptiver [125]. We created
a Lua script that runs inside Apache and intercepts all requests coming to the server
after the headers are parsed as in figure 7.6. The script prepares the request and
sends it to Deceptiver. It also parses Deceptiver’s response and enforces it inside the
WAF. The overall design of the Apache integration is depicted in figure 7.7.
1http://www.peewee-orm.com/
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1 SecRuleScript ’deceptiver.lua’ ’ id :1001,t :none,phase:2,pass,nolog, ctl :ruleRemoveById=9000’
2 SecAction ’id:9000,pass,nolog,phase:2,skipAfter,END OF RULES’
Figure 7.6.: Intercepting All Requests Inside Apache
Currently, Apache’s hook is implemented as an internal configuration, i.e., .conf,
file for Apache that is loaded when Apache starts. It is part of the production Apache
server configuration and runs seamlessly in the background. In addition, because of
the flexibility of Apache’s configuration, Deceptiver can be integrated with only part
of the server under a specific directory or only when a certain type or specific resource
is requested.
Figure 7.7.: Hooking Deceptiver with Apache
7.5 Security Discussion
Deceptiver is designed to centralize and manage the integration of deception with
organization’s servers. It works by intercepting server requests and responses and
injecting deceit to confuse adversaries and/or lead them astray. The main advantage
of using Deceptiver is that adversaries do not interact with it directly, as in the
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case with honeypots. It does not run a copy of resources and lure adversaries to
interact with the fake system instead of the real one. This has been one of the
reasons that hindered the adoption of honeypot technologies because they come with
the risk that adversaries might use them as an entry point to the real organization’s
resources. Additionally, Deceptiver does not add another set of fake system for system
administrators to maintain and keep updated and patched — unlike traditional uses
of honeypots.
By design, Deceptiver does not maintain fake copies of targeted resource; instead
it injects deceit to the server’s response on-the-fly and, in some cases, omit real infor-
mation. This design increases the plausibility of Deceptiver responses in comparison
to traditional uses of deceptive response. This is true because real-time changes to
system resources are immediately reflected in the adversary’s view of the systems.
This comes without the extra cost of maintaining fake copies of those resources or the
need to update a separate fake image of the system. This design ensures that there is
no time lapse and real-time changes are reflected in Deceptiver responses. This time
lag needed to update the fake copies in traditional uses of deception is often used as
an indicator that deception is currently being used as a defense mechanism.
In addition, Deceptiver uses deceptive traps to reduce the number of false positives
and better distinguish between di↵erent levels of trust with respect to a system’s users.
These traps do not a↵ect a normal user’s behavior and should be enticing enough for
some adversaries to fall for them hoping to find vulnerabilities in their targets.
It is worth pointing out that the current design of Deceptiver make it an attractive
target of an attack. An adversary who compromises Deceptiver would be able to view
the interactions of all connected Internet-facing servers. Even though Deceptiver is
not public-facing, it receives input from many servers that is potentially injected by
an adversary. It is crucial to sanitize all inputs forwarded to Deceptiver. In addition,
Deceptiver should be placed in a separate process space internally with strict API
that only accepts requests from known hooks. To address the allure of Deceptiver, we
can change the design of the server to move the decision making to the hooks instead
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of the core. The role of the core would thus be simply to log interactions and connect
between di↵erent servers when needed.
7.6 Performance Analysis
To analyze the performance of Deceptiver and its integration with Apache, we
designed a number of experiments. We measured the performance di↵erence between
running Apache with and without Deceptiver. To do so, we used the httperf tool2
to benchmark Apache’s performance in these two cases. More specifically, we used
autobench3 that works as a wrapper over httperf to automate the benchmarking
process. The performance results of our experiment are summarized in table 7.1.
A simultaneous number of requests were sent and the average response time was
recorded. The time was measured in milliseconds.












10 0.2 0.8 0.4 258.1
20 0.2 0.7 0.4 491
30 0.2 0.6 0.4 538.7
40 0.2 0.7 0.4 628.2
50 0.2 0.7 0.4 638.2
60 0.3 0.7 0.4 665.9
70 0.2 0.7 0.3 672
80 0.3 0.6 0.4 678.7
90 0.3 0.6 0.4 696.5
100 0.2 0.6 0.4 744.8
We noted a clear reduction in performance when using Deceptiver. To understand
the cause of such performance degradation, we measured the performance of four dif-




mod security modules. The first column in table 7.1 presents the performance of
running Apache without enabling the mod security module. The second column
shows the performance after enabling the module, with its default rules and con-
figurations; there was a negligible reduction in performance in this case. The third
column illustrates Apache’s average response time while enabling mod security and
enforcing OWASP’s ModSecurity Core Rule Set version 2.2.9 [149]. The fourth col-
umn illustrates Apache’s performance when Deceptiver is in use and mod security
is enabled to enforce Deceptiver rules. After viewing the results, we concluded that
simply enabling mod security is not the cause of the performance degrade and that
we need to analyze Deceptiver further to measure its performance.
We ran Unix’s utility function time4 with deceptiver.py as its input – this
the main file that executes Deceptiver’s logic – and we got 126ms of total exe-
cution time. To investigate this further we used the line profiler python pack-
age5 that gives us the run time for each line in the program. We found nine lines
of code in deceptiver.py that accounts for 99.2% of the total execution time of
deceptiver.py. All these lines are querying the Deceptiver database for rules and
actions to take. In addition, Deceptiver saves the request information in the database.
Optimizing database querying is crucial to enhance the performance of Deceptiver.
One way of improving the performance is to use a persistent database connection in-
stead of having to create and tear down the database connection for every query. This
can be achieved by the use of QuerySet API in python and optimizing the number
of database queries sent. In addition, standard database optimization techniques,
such as indexing, can be used to enhance the performance. Finally, Deceptiver can
asynchronously save the request information in the database after responding back
to Apache instead of blocking the response until the update is done.
In addition, it should be possible to eliminate the need of an SQL server to sig-
nificantly reduce the performance impact when using Deceptiver. Running all De-




is similar to other running modes in table 7.1. Deceptiver uses an SQL server for
two main reasons; (i) find whether a rule exists to apply to the current request; and
(ii) save the current request information and the rules applied to it. As discussed
earlier, the former can be done in a non-blocking operation. In addition, we can save
such information by logging it in a file. The former goal can be achieved by having
an in-memory hash data structure that maps request information into the rule that
needs to be applied. This data structure can be initialized once during the start of
the server and kept in memory. The operation checking whether a rule exists for the
following request would be executed in a constant time and it will be a simple hashing
of the request variables and checking for a match. This should be an interesting task
to further extend the functionality of Deceptiver and enhance its performance.
7.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a deceptive fake server referred to as Deceptiver.
The server hooks into a company’s servers and injects deceit creating a fake view of
an organization’s resources to confuse them and/or lead them astray. We discussed
the design of our deceptive server and how it can be attached to many servers within
an organization to provide a centralized deception.
The server provides two di↵erent categories of deceptive responses: deceptive traps
and active deceptive responses. The former focuses on detecting adversaries’ activities
in their reconnaissance stage where they monitor servers’ responses to their input.
Deceptiver creates some enticing, yet non-functional, traps for attackers. The latter
case of response focuses on presenting a fake, yet plausible view of systems resources.
We built a proof-of-concept implementation of Deceptiver and a hook to the
Apache server. We discussed the deployment and implementation details. In ad-
dition, we present a discussion of Deceptiver performance and how it can improved.




In this dissertation we discussed the concept of deception and how it has been
an integral part of human activity throughout history. Deception is extensively doc-
umented in animal behavior (mainly as a defensive mechanism), human physical
security behavior, and in conflict and war. In computing, the discussion of using de-
ception as a defenses started in the 1980s. We gave a broad overview of the concept
of deception, highlighting its role in many areas of computing.
In addition, we presented a framework of how deception can be planned and inte-
grated into computer security defenses. Our framework provides a holistic overview
of the role of deception and how it can be applied. Within our model we present an
analysis of the role of adversary biases in the success of any deceptive technique. We
discuss how such biases can be exploited to enhance the security of computer systems.
Deception has been used haphazardly within computer defenses. We presented
a working definition of the use of deception in security and highlighted some of
the unique advantages deception-based mechanisms bring to computer defense. An
overview of the proliferation of honey-prefixed tools in the early 2000s, where many
deceptive techniques have been applied, is provided. Moreover, we analyzed two pre-
vious proposals to use deception as a defensive technique and mapped them against
our framework.
In the second part of the dissertation, we presented three computer security de-
fenses that use deceptive techniques in the core of their design. We show how we can
enhance the security of passwords at the client side and in transit using a deceptive
covert channel. After that, we discuss how the ersatzpasswords scheme can be used to
significantly address the challenge of stolen stored password files. We discuss how we
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make passwords cracking insuperable without physical access to the victim’s servers.
Also, we show we can deceive adversaries by presenting them with fake passwords
when they attempt to crack stolen password files.
We concluded the dissertation by discussing the design of a centralized deceptive
server, referred to as Deceptiver, that employs deceptive techniques to Internet-facing
servers. We show how this design reduces the information leaked about protected
computer systems. We integrated our deceptive core with Apache’s web server and
discussed the design, implementation, and performance of our prototype.
8.2 Future Work
The use of deception has shown a number of interesting and promising results
in enhancing the security of computer systems. Previous attempts to use deceit
were mostly ad-hoc attempts to integrate deception into computer defense. Many
successful computer attacks rely on deceiving humans to infiltrate their targets and
exploit their biases. Our framework provides the first steps for a holistic view of
using deception as a defensive mechanism with consideration of how deception works,
where to apply it, and how it is evaluated and monitored.
One of the interesting areas for future work is a deeper understanding of how
to successfully use deception. Humans, and by extension the software they write,
have biases that should be understood and e↵ectively exploited to have an e↵ective
security mechanism. Researching and understanding these biases, including cogni-
tive, cultural, and organizational biases, is essential to the e↵ective use of deceptive
techniques.
Another interesting area of future research is exploring when and how deception
can be applied. We discussed the cyber kill-chain model earlier in this dissertation
and pointed out that deception can be applied at any phase in the kill chain. The
original kill chain paper suggested that the earlier one stops an attacker the better.
We argue that the earlier one spots an attack and then uses deceit and misinformation
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is better for defense. Security administrators would not only stop an attack, but also
lead attackers astray, wasting their time and resources, and learn about their motives
and targets. Investigating di↵erent deception-based defensive techniques that can be
applied at di↵erent stages of the kill-chain is one area of future research.
Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate how di↵erent deceptive mecha-
nisms can be used with di↵erent bad actors. It would be interesting to investigate how
di↵erent actors would react to di↵erent types of deception. Another area of future
research is examining the relationships between consistency and deception. Investi-
gating the properties of using inconsistent deception is an interesting area of further
research.
The area of counter-deception is another fruitful area of further research. Many of
the long-standing cyber attacks such as phishing, scams, and others employ deception
as a cornerstone in their design. Further understanding human biases in interacting
with such attack venues would give computer security experts better ways to alter
user behavior to enhance security. When security tools can identify the set of biases
being exploited by adversaries, they can give users more meaningful warnings and
better guide their behavior.
In this dissertation, we developed a high-level framework describing how decep-
tion can be planned and integrated. Modeling deception is an area that needs further
research. Game theoretical models, such as hypergames, can help computer security
defenders get a better understanding of the role of perception in computer attacks.
Hypergames model how multi-level misperceptions determine the final outcome of a
conflict [13]. Furthermore, more detailed frameworks would guide security adminis-
trators on how can they integrate deception in their defenses.
Within the three practical novel uses of deception there are a number of areas in
which our work can be further developed. It would be interesting to integrate our
deceptive covert channel with some two-factor authentication clients such as Google
Authenticator and analyze how that increases users’ security. In addition, a more
rigorous user study can be done to evaluate the usability of our scheme.
140
Ersatzpasswords deployment can be further extended in a number of ways. In our
implementation, we used a simple ersatzpasswords generation algorithm. It would be
interesting to see how other generation algorithms can be used and how they compare.
One especially important aspect is how to make them appear plausible when cracked
by an adversary. Further analysis of publicly leaked passwords can give us insights on
how the collective ersatzpasswords appear plausible. In addition, one of the issues we
discussed in our implementation analysis is performance. We used a primitive HSM
that plugs to a computer’s USB port. It would be interesting to see how performance
can be improved with dedicated HSMs or some PUFs.
We discussed aspects in the design and implementation of the Deceptiver server.
There are a number of ways in which Deceptiver can be enhanced. First, Deceptiver
can be integrated with more servers such as FTP servers. In addition, more deceptive
responses and traps can be added to Deceptiver. Second, it would also be interesting
to deploy Deceptiver and analyze real world results. This might reveal some patterns
that can further help refine the design and implementation of Deceptiver. Third, we
discussed how we can add inconsistent deception as a defensive technique. Investi-
gating how inconsistent deception can be used and applied is an interesting area of
further research. Finally, we identified a number of ways of improving Deceptiver’s
performance. Further analyzing and implementing ways to improve the performance
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A.1 Deceptiver Command Line Inputs
The sever is invoked by executing python3 deceptiver.py (arguments). The
following list are the inputs to the server as command line arguments.
• ’-a’ or ’–admin’
Takes you to the administrative section of Deceptiver.
• ’-s’ or ’–server’
To provide the type of server initiating the Deceptiver. E.g., http, ftp, etc.
• ’–sd’ or ’–server-details’
To provide the server details such as version, name, etc.
• ’-p’ or ’–port’
The port the server is listening on.
• ’–uri’
To provide the server the requested resource URI.
• ’–ip’
To provide the IPv4 address of the client requesting access. The IP address must
be the in the format of x.x.x.x.
• ’–secure’
When this argument is included, it informs the Deceptiver that the connection
was made over a secure channel.
• ’-m’ or ’–malicious’
When this argument is included, it informs the Deceptiver that the server knows
that this client is malicious.
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• When the server is an HTTP server, the following arguments can be used:






The following arguments are always required ’-s’, ’–sd’, ’-p’, ’–uri’ and ’–ip’ and
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